Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform\u27s Favorite Procurement Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery Contract by Thornton, Karen
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2002 
Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform's Favorite Procurement Vehicle, 
the Indefinite Delivery Contract 
Karen Thornton 
George Washington University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thornton, Karen, Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform's Favorite Procurement Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery 
Contract (2002). Karen DaPonte Thornton, Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform’s Favorite Procurement 
Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 Pub. Cont. L.J. 383 (2002). ; GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper No. 2018-21; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-21. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168766 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform's Favorite




II. The Evolving Acceptance of Indefinite Delivery Vehicles 387
A. Definitions 387
B. GAO's First Impressions of Indefinite Delivery Contracts 389
III. The Role of Indefinite Delivery Contracts in Procurement
Reform 392
A. Section 800 Panel 393
B. SWAT Team Report 394
C. National Performance Review 395
D. Increased Discretion and Workforce Reductions 396
IV. Congress Enacts the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 398
A. An Analysis of FASA 398
B. Legislative History 400
V. Repeated Criticisms of Indefinite Delivery Contracting
Practices Mandate Improvements 402
A. The Valenzuela Protest and the Dangers to Small
Businesses of Limited Competition 402
B. A Troubled Silence: FASA's Bar Against Bid Protests
Challenging Task and Delivery Orders 407
C. GAO Provides Transparency and Accountability Despite
the Bar Against Protests 408
D. Poorly Estimated Quantities and the Loss of Contractor
Faith 410
1. Estimated Quantities 411
2. Fair Opportunity to Compete 413
E. The Balancing Act: Do Multiple Awardees Have a Fair
Opportunity to Compete and Is the Government Getting
the Full Benefit of the Multiple Award Preference? 415
E The Proliferation of Interagency Contracting and
Questionable Service Fees 416
Karen DaPonte Thornton is a procurement attorney with the Office of the Chief Counsel,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This Article was submitted in partial satisfaction of the require-
ments for the degree of Master of Laws in Federal Procurement at George Washington University
School of Law. This Article was tied for first place in the 2001 Public Contract Law Journal
Writing Competition (Professional Division). The opinions expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Public Contract Law Journal - Vol. 31, No. 3 e Spring 2002
VI. Recommendations for Improvement 418
A. Why FAR Revisions to Date Have Failed to Provide a
Solution 418
B. Lessons Learned from Efforts to Tighten the Regulation of
Contract Bundling 422




During the past two decades, acquisition reform efforts played a vital role
in government reinvention. The main objective of these efforts was to im-
prove efficiency and commercialize government procurement by abolishing
inflexible rules and empowering a trimmed workforce. Seven years after pas-
sage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA),1 a new
administration is in office and an assessment of the effectiveness of reform
initiatives, particularly in the realm of indefinite delivery contracting, is in
order.
In rating the success of reform, the crucial question is whether streamlined
procurement methods and increased Contracting Officer discretion have im-
proved the manner in which the Government procures its needs. Critics
complain that the increasingly unregulated use of indefinite delivery con-
tracts allows agencies to blur the transparency of traditionally rule-bound
federal procurement. Others defend that red tape reduction and new con-
tracting tools are the only way a reduced acquisition workforce can get the
job done on a tight budget.
FASA-instituted reforms brought measured benefit to the procurement
system by way of indefinite delivery contracting. Improvements came, how-
ever, at the price of public confidence in the basic contracting principles of
integrity, transparency, and competition. At the root of this mounting crisis
is the Government's lack of attention to Contracting Officers' training and
its failure to effectively manage personnel downsizing. The indiscriminate
use of the indefinite delivery contracting tool, an effect of enhanced agency
flexibility, threatens to erode public confidence, unless agencies adopt a rea-
sonable number of constraints, accompanied by meaningful guidance and an
improved acquisition team approach to contracting.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) allowed for indefinite delivery contracts, which the Government
most popularly implemented in service contracts. They served their purpose
1. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat.
3243 (1994).
384
best when the acquiring agency generally knew its requirements but could
not anticipate exact quantities. Agencies appreciated the indefinite delivery
contract tool as a means of simplifying the solicitation process and relieving
administrative burdens, but recognized the risk of inhibiting competition.
Congress, meanwhile, warned agencies against issuing task and delivery or-
ders outside the contract scope, relying too heavily on contractors, and failing
to use cost as a valid selection criterion.
Today, these concerns remain in need of focused attention. FASA's en-
couragement of multiple award contracts and removal of General Accounting
Office (GAO) bid protest jurisdiction over task orders were intended to pro-
mote innovation and Contracting Officer flexibility. The clamor for greater
Contracting Officer discretion and workforce downsizing, however, was
louder than the general warnings in the Act's legislative history regarding
awareness of small business opportunities and vague statements of work. Stat-
utory reforms were met with silence from the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) Council, which failed to furnish any meaningful guidance. Instead,
reformers rallied with a cry to entrust Contracting Officers to use their busi-
ness judgment and achieve the best, most commercial-like result. Reformers
criticized the FAR system as hindering Contracting Officer creativity and
ability to select the best value offeror. This sentiment stoked a dangerous
attitude that fewer rules would translate to greater efficiency.
Recent Inspector General (IG) audits, GAO reports, and protest decisions
strongly recommend a tempering of this view. The reports document wide-
spread sole sourcing and cost inefficiencies, said to be the result of Contract-
ing Officers exercising their discretion to limit competition and directing
contractors to work beyond the contract scope. Agencies package huge
amounts of work into multiple award contracts without seeking multiple of-
fers on orders. Meanwhile, the breadth of the work statements in such con-
tracts makes it nearly impossible for the Contracting Officer to maintain
consistent, effective administrative oversight. This frequently results in ex-
cessive and costly reliance on the contractor. GAO protest decisions suggest
agencies are combining large, diverse work requirements in violation of laws
prohibiting bundling. The lost opportunities for small businesses to compete
and improper sole sourcing are earning indefinite delivery contracting the
reputation of a potentially useful contracting tool run amok.
The problems associated with indefinite delivery contracting can be al-
leviated, however, if more attention is devoted to accountability and Con-
tracting Officer participation on the acquisition team. Multiple award con-
tracting has been called a great concept plagued by poor implementation.' It
is much easier to coin symbolic terms, such as "streamlining" and "powering
down," in hopes of propelling a procurement revolution than to invest in
2. See John Cibinic, Task Order Contracting: Great Concept, Poor Implementation, 12
NASH & CIBINic REP. T 30 (July 1998).
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methodical consideration of management solutions.' The fragile balance be-
tween easing administrative burdens and upholding the timeless procurement
principles of competition, integrity, and public scrutiny remains unstable. It
will take more than FAR guidance or heightened Office of Federal Policy
Procurement (OFPP) awareness to establish an effective fix.
A consciousness-raising is needed to better define and appreciate the role
of the Contracting Officer on the acquisition team. Only then can program
managers, technical experts, and end users learn to accept that only specific
work statements can be well managed. This includes an appreciation that
bundled, nationwide work statements are impossible to manage effectively.
Otherwise, the value a Contracting Officer adds to the process erodes and
the whole procurement suffers. It is time to shift focus to identify tools and
adopt policies that enable Contracting Officers to contain and remedy those
troubles.
One commentator has gone so far as to describe the present state of affairs
in government contracting as one of "lawlessness. ''4 It resembles the condi-
tions that led to demands for reform in the early 1980s, with respect to
Contracting Officer practices that restricted competition, but then the prob-
lems were more comprehensive. Today, improvements in the indefinite de-
livery process can be made readily.
This article offers recommendations for achieving realistic and legitimate
reform within regulatory constraints. Section II provides a comprehensive
definition and history of the evolving prevalence of indefinite delivery con-
tracts. Section III describes the early phases of procurement reform and in-
definite delivery's discovery as a darling among reformers. Section IV pro-
vides an analysis of the Section 800 Panel's efforts, the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act, and its legislative history. Following these background sec-
tions, section V discusses numerous criticisms of indefinite delivery contract-
ing in practice and serious consequences from the continued failure to heed
warnings reiterated ever since the early meetings of the Section 800 Panel.
Section VI then recommends solutions for the most serious trouble spots;
these solutions may include improved, substantive guidance for Contracting
Officers, metered regulatory controls to restrain the use of the powerful in-
definite delivery contracting tool, and, finally, a simplified approach to en-
courage and enhance the Contracting Officer's role on the acquisition team.
The article concludes that regulatory and perhaps statutory constraints are
needed to "legitimize" government flexibility and efficiency.
3. Stephen M. Daniels, Why We Should Be Concerned About the Movement Toward
Procurement Reform, Amuy LAw. 3, 4 (Mar. 1997).
4. Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Gov-
ernment, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 627, 712 (2001).
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II. The Evolving Acceptance of Indefinite Contract Vehicles
Generally, an acquisition for goods or services begins with the identifi-
cation of agency need and some level of planning.5 This is followed by public
advertisement of the solicitation and a competitive award process, governed
by a complex set of rules to make each stage of the procurement process fairly
transparent to the public and ensure integrity.6 This may encumber an
agency's ability to timely procure goods or services at the best value to the
Government. Innovative, nontraditional contract vehicles were developed
to overcome such impediments and expedite the procurement process.
For example, an agency is often unable to forecast its long-term needs with
definiteness, particularly when contracting for maintenance, personal ser-
vices, and consumable office supplies. To adjust for such uncertainties, agen-
cies promoted the concept of indefinite delivery contracts. Indefinite delivery
contracts earned favor because they allow an agency to avoid overpurchasing
or stockpiling supplies that it does not require immediately and to order only
when it identifies a need. By the 1970s, despite a lack of statutory recognition,
indefinite delivery contracts were widely used.7
A. Definitions
There are numerous forms of contracts in which the quantity term is vari-
able, including multiyear procurements, indefinite delivery contracts, letter
contracts, and job order contracts. The most common of these is the indef-
inite delivery contract, which comes in three varieties: (1) requirements con-
tracts, (2) indefinite quantity contracts, and (3) definite quantity contracts. 8
The agency awards a requirements contract with the understanding that
the contractor will be its sole provider, at an agreed-upon price, of all the
agency's needs defined within the purpose and time period terms of the con-
tract. The contract does not contain a guaranteed minimum award amount;
therefore, consideration is achieved in the promise that all orders will be
fulfilled by the selected contractor.9 Successful implementation of require-
ments contracts requires that the Government make a reasoned, good-faith
5. See Prospero S. Virden, Jr., Indefinite Delivery Contracts, BRIEFING PAPERS, Apr.
1978, at 1.
6. See id.
7. Peter J. Ritenberg, Task Order Contracts: Popular But Are They Legal?, 22 NAT'L
CONT. MGMT. J. 33, 34-36 (Summer 1988). ASPR 1-201.6, (June 1, 1950); ASPR 3-
409, (Feb. 6, 1953); ASPR 3-409 (Mar. 15, 1962).
8. See FAR 16.501; ASPR 3-409 (Mar. 15, 1962); Mason v. United States, 615 F2d
1343 (Ct. CI. 1980); Virden, supra note 5, at 1.
9. See ASPR 3-409.2 (Mar. 15, 1962); Tomcello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 761
(Ct. C1. 1982); Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168, 172 (1877); Smoot v. United
States, 237 U.S. 38, 42 (1915).
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quantity estimate to forecast the amount of supplies or services it anticipates
it will need. 10
In Torncello v. United States," the seminal case on the distinction between
requirements and indefinite quantity contracts, the U.S. Navy entered into
a requirements contract with Soledad Enterpriseslz for grounds maintenance
and refuse removal, to include rodent pest control, at housing projects in San
Diego. During the contract's performance, the Navy identified a need for
gopher control. Based upon a competitive bid from its Public Works office
the Navy had received prior to its contract award to Soledad, the Navy knew
the gopher job could be accomplished for less than the $500 per call Soledad
had bid for rat control. When the Navy issued the task order for gopher
control to the Public Works office, Soledad filed suit claiming the Govern-
ment had breached its requirements contract by diverting the work to an-
other source. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) held
the Government's failure to comply with the terms of the contract entitled
Soledad only to the same recovery as if the Government had terminated its
contract for convenience. 3
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Claims, Torncello, Soledad's successor-in-
interest, argued the constructive termination of convenience doctrine should
not allow the Government to avoid its contractual obligations. The Navy
defended its actions by arguing the contract was actually an indefinite quan-
tity contract, which would allow the Government to make a zero order;
alternatively, if it were a requirements contract, the constructive termination
doctrine would apply.
The court concluded that Torncello's contract was a requirements contract
as opposed to an indefinite quantity contract. It noted that indefinite quan-
tity contracts include an obligatory minimum quantity to provide consider-
ation for otherwise uncertain contract terms. By comparison, requirements
contracts promise no specific amount, but they are deemed valid by the Gov-
ernment's guarantee to look to the contractor for fulfillment of all require-
10. See Womack v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 399 (1968). Under a requirements
contract, a contractor will not be eligible for relief if the agency has no actual needs or
the actual needs do not coincide with the estimated needs. The contract will be rendered
illusory, however, if the Government awards a task order to a competing contractor for
work within the contract scope.
11. Torncello, 681 E2d at 758.
12. Tomcello was the president of Soledad Enterprises and its successor-in-interestafter
Soledad went bankrupt.
13. See Soledad Enters., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 20376, 20423, 20424, 20425, 20426, 77-2
BCA 91 12,552. In the context of a requirements contract, however, this rendered a mean-
ingless result because there were no incurred costs to compensate under the terms of the
termination for convenience clause. The court distinguished Colonial Metals v. United
States, 494 F.2d 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974), by noting the Government terminated Torncello's
contract to take advantage of a price it had known about at the time of award. The Navy's
preservation of a means of unlimited exculpation through the convenience termination
clause rendered the contract illusory.
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ments under the contract as they develop. The Navy's argument would allow
the Government at its whim to transform a requirements contract into an
indefinite quantity contract with no stated minimum.14 The court held the
contract between Navy and Torncello was not stated in terms that could be
interpreted as a guaranteed minimum and was therefore by definition a re-
quirements contract.1 5
The Torncello case defines the distinguishing characteristic of indefinite
quantity contracts. Indefinite quantity contracts contain stated maximum and
minimum limits for a determined period of time. The Government obligates
itself to purchase a minimum, amount of supplies or services and the con-
tractor is assured of minimal sales.16 The minimum amount established in the
contract must be for more than a nominal amount in order to fulfill the
requirement for consideration. The opinion also stands for the principle that
an agency's ability to avoid its obligations must be limited by more than the
"Government's best interests" standard; otherwise, an agency would be
merely promising not to do anything against its interest. 7
The third and final type of indefinite delivery contract is the definite
quantity contract. Such contracts provide for the purchase of a definite quan-
tity of supplies or performance of specific services for a stated period of time.
Definite quantity contracts often include variation in estimated quantity
clauses8 to provide flexibility. The promises and obligations made by each
party in a definite quantity contract define the maximum and minimum
performances of each and thereby provide the requisite consideration for
enforceability. 19 Promises made under the other two types of indefinite de-
livery contracts are characteristically less certain.
B. GAO's First Impressions of Indefinite Delivery Contracts
By 1962, indefinite delivery-type contracts merited their own ASPR sec-
tion, which described the three varieties of indefinite delivery contracts avail-
able for use when the exact time of delivery is unknown on the award date.
The regulation cautioned that requirements and indefinite quantity contracts
14. The court further concluded the Termination for Convenience Clause is only avail-
able in situations where the expectations of the parties have changed to the extent that
the clause is employed only to allocate risk. Torncello v. United States, 681 E2d 756, 770
(Ct. Cl. 1982) (citing Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489 (1923)).
15. The Federal Circuit has since reaffirmed the Torncello doctrine. See Maxima Corp.
v. United States, 847 F2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For a discussion of Maxima, where the
Government improperly retroactively terminated the contract for convenience after com-
pletion of contract performance, see John Cibinic, Contract Claims, 2 NASH & CIBINIC
REP. T 43 (July 1988).
16. See Tennessee Soap Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 154 (1954); FAR 16.504
(a)(2).
17. See John Cibinic, Convenience Terminations: What Are the Limits?, 10 NASH &
CImBNic REP. T 52 (Oct. 1996).
18. See FAR 52.211-18.
19. See Torncello v. United States, 681 F2d 756, 761 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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were generally appropriate for use only in commercial item and services pro-
curements and when the need was expected to recur.20
In the late 1970s and 1980s, indefinite delivery contracts became accepted
as legitimate and were popular service contract vehicles. Service contracts
tend to include work requirements that vary over the life of the contract and
fulfill agency needs that recur with some frequency. It is cumbersome to award
contracts at a pace that meets an agency's evolving needs and almost im-
possible to anticipate those needs to the level of detail needed to write a
specific scope of work. A contract for base operations and maintenance, for
instance, will involve varying levels of need .for lawncare, sanitation, and
heating/ventilation/air-conditioning maintenance. Having a single contract
from which to issue orders on an immediate basis relieves the burden of
administering several contracts and coordinating multiple specialized con-
tractors. More controversial is the view that an indefinite delivery contract
also leads to superior pricing because it affords the contractor flexibility to
use its employees efficiently. When a boiler room emergency occurs, the
Contracting Officer can issue an order without the preparation and compe-
tition required for a separate contract.
While agencies enjoyed the use of indefinite delivery contracts, GAO
audits during the mid-1970s criticized the agencies' inability to articulate
more specific work statements. One audit described indefinite contract in-
struments as undesirable because they allow the contractor a minimal cost
risk." The Comptroller General recognized the contracting tool simplified
the solicitation process and relieved the agency of certain administrative
burdens in the award process, yet found task order contracts to "violate the
spirit of competition." 2 GAO's audit revealed that because many varied tasks
arise under a single contract, the Government does not always benefit from
performance by the best-qualified contractor at the most advantageous price.
GAO refused, in other words, to accept the idea that administrative expe-
diency alone could justify less than maximum competition.2 3
Nevertheless, in 1976, GAO approved the Navy's award of a cost plus
fixed fee indefinite delivery contract as proper, despite the lack of a "com-
pletely comprehensive statement of work. 24 The Comptroller General ap-
parently was not troubled that the indefinite description would "automati-
cally preclude an effective cost comparison."25 In later opinions, however,
GAO clarified that broad statements of work can indeed "make meaningful
20. See ASPR 3-409 (Mar. 15, 1962).
21. See Ritenburg, supra note 7.
22. Id. at 34.
23. See id. at 36; Department of Agriculture's Use of Master Agreements, 54 Comp.
Gen. 392 (1975); and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. PSAD-80-35, CONTROLS
OVER CONSULTING SERVICE CONTRACTS AT FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TIGHTENING 18-
19, (1980).
24. Grey Advertising, Inc., B-184825, May 14, 1976, 76-1 CPD 9[ 325.
25. Id.
_3!D0
competition difficult" and result in a missed opportunity to award to a qual-
ified contractor at the lowest price under a specific task order.2 6 GAO also
explained that even though the types of compensation listed in the ASPR
did not include cost reimbursement or fee awards, statutory construction rules
allow for alternatives to be used unless specifically excluded. When the ASPR
evolved into the Defense Acquisition Regulation and then into the FAR,
the provision for indefinite delivery contract pricing remained the same.
Many agencies read GAO's opinion to mean there are few restrictions on
the pricing of indefinite delivery contracts.27 Pricing and quantity estimates
remain a central issue of concern today and will be discussed further below.
Agencies took advantage of single-award indefinite delivery contracts to
avoid the delays associated with awarding numerous individual contracts for
specific requirements and the legal challenges of multiaward contracts.18 In
1984, the FAR did not define task order contracts but authorized them as a
viable contracting instrument despite GAO's initial position of discouraging
their use because of the negative impact on competition and best value. 9
Still, GAO had not declared task order contracts illegal30
Also in 1984, in response to an uproar over perceived abuses in federal
procurement, Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA).1 CICA defined the principle of "full and open competition" and
called attention to small business participation in government contracting.
The general foundation for these efforts was the assumption that competition
would provide innovation, quality, and affordability and keep government
actors honest. 2
GAO continued to broaden its acceptance of nonspecific solicitation lan-
guage, despite the CICA's renewed emphasis on competition.33 GAO also
seemed to retreat from its concern about general work statements and limited
its scrutiny to solicitations that inhibit intelligent competition by failing to
26. General Accounting Office, B-196489, Feb. 15, 1980, a letter to Chairman John
D. Dingell of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, House Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee.
27. See Ritenburg, supra note 7, at 37.
28. See Mason v. United States, 615 F.2d 1343, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
29. See FAR 2.101.
30. See Ritenburg, sup'ra note 7, at 39.
31. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.). In an
opening statement to hearings on procurement corruption, the chairman of the House
Committee on Government Operations cited $435 hammers as an indication of "the
sweetheart deals that occur daily.., throughout the Federal Government." STEVEN KEL-
MAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE FEAR OF DISCRETION AND THE
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 12,17 (1990). In Chairman John Brooks's view,
the rampant lack of competition was wasting billions in taxpayer dollars. He felt only "full
and open competition" could prevent huge firms from monopolizing the government
market and charge inflated prices to agencies with which they had earned favor. Id.
32. See generally Department of Defense Directive No. 5000.1, 4.3.3 (Oct. 23, 2000).
33. See Ritenburg, supra note 7, at 41.
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give competitors sufficient detail and task orders that exceed the scope of
the original contract.3 4 The use of task order contracts flourished (based on
the relative number protested at GAO), giving at least the impression that
agencies were experimenting with innovative contracting techniques.3"
Common examples of task order contracts included services contracts for
manpower studies, technical support, information resources, and environ-
mental support.
In those frontier days of indefinite quantity contracting, GAO established
at least one strict boundary for the use of task orders. An overly general
statement of work in the solicitation was considered susceptible to protest
for the improper award of task orders outside the scope of the contract. In
Northeast Air Group, GAO found that a task order for technical assistance
in financial management matters was outside the scope of a contract for
financial and compliance audit services.3 6 The work statement contained
frequent use of vague terms such as "may perform" and "may be required,"
but this alone did not trouble GAO. The Comptroller General's fundamental
concern was that the contractor might not perform at the most advantageous
price.37
III. The Role of Indefinite Delivery Contracting in Procurement Reform
It was not long before the burgeoning use of indefinite delivery contracting
caught Congress's attention. Toward the end of the 1980s, the Government
initiated an effort to demystify the complexity of procurement laws and make
it easier for agencies to procure needed goods and services. The first mean-
ingful endeavor in this new movement was the Defense Management Review
of 1989,38 an internal DoD examination of organizational and personnel re-
34. See id. at 40. In International Security Technology, Inc., B-215029, Jan. 2, 1985,
85-1 CPD I 6, a protest arose out of award of a contract for automatic data processing
risk analysis and security audit services. The protester alleged the three hypothetical task
orders described in the RFP rendered the solicitation ambiguous so that it was impossible
for offerors to determine the required level of effort and compete on an even plane. GAO
denied the protest, stating that the test task orders, while limited in detail, provided
sufficient description of the location and type of task orders the awardee could expect.
Furthermore, GAO noted that with eight firms submitting proposals, there was no evi-
dence to show the solicitation language had inhibited competition.
35. "While we know that the use of task order contracts is widespread and has grown
significantly since 1980, we do not know how many are in use and we do not fully know
what forms they take or how they are being used." Vernon J. Edwards, Guest Appearance:
The New Rules for Multiple Award Task Order Contracting, 9 NASH & CIBINIc REP. % 35
(June 1995).
36. B-288210, Jan. 14, 1988, 88-1 CPD 33.
37. See id.
38. Earlier attempts at reform fizzled. In 1986, President Reagan commissioned a Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (also known as the Packard Commission)
to study ways to ease the complexity of federal procurement and make recommendations
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forms intended to improve the agency's buying practices. DoD sent a report
of the resulting changes to Congress in 1990. Congress's most notable re-
sponse was to institute a DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel (Section 800
Panel), as enacted in section 800 of the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense
Authorization Act.39 Congress tasked the Section 800 Panel to conduct a
study of procurement-related laws and recommend specific ways to simplify
and streamline those laws to improve the procurement process. Unlike earlier
studies with similar goals, the Section 800 Panel was charged with recom-
mending specific changes to acquisition laws.40
A. Section 800 Panel
The Section 800 Panel's report and recommendations covered a wide
spectrum of procurement issues, from commercial items and contracting out
to standards of conduct and auditing. In the area of competitive negotiation
procedures, the panel focused on methods of streamlining and simplifying
the procurement system to increase efficiency.41 The panel determined that
inefficiencies more often arose from agency implementation of statutory re-
quirements than from overly onerous laws. Therefore, the panel report rec-
ommended agencies style their supplemental regulations in a fashion that
would streamline procedures and avoid inefficiency. This resulted in the ex-
cision of large sections of existing regulatory guidance to make room for
greater Contracting Officer discretion.42
The panel considered the use of task order contracts as part of its review
of ways to streamline procurement. The panel report discussed agencies' use
of indefinite delivery contracts to avoid statutory competition requirements
rather than to enhance cost savings and contractor performance through
for statutory change. The Packard Commission's recommended legislative changes failed
to materialize because Congress and the administration were unable to coordinate their
efforts. Later Congress attempted, unsuccessfully, to authorize waivers from unspecified
acquisition laws under the National Defense Authorization Acts of Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991. Other reform efforts initiated by the Committee on Governmental Affairs did not
have enough support to make it out of Congress. See William T. Woods, FASA: How
Much Reform Did We Get?, 30 PROCUREMENT LAW. 11, 11 (1995); Margaret G. Rumbaugh,
Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws: DoD's Magnum Opus, 4 ToPIcAL ISSUES IN PRO-
CUREMENT SERIES 1, 2 (July 1993); Ralph C. Nash, Reforming the Procurement Process: Part
1-The Proposals Are Coming, 7 NASH & CIBINIc REP. 7, 17-18 (Feb. 1993); S. REP.
No. 103-258 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2564.
39. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510.
§ 800, 104 Star. 1485 (1990).
40. See Rumbaugh, supra note 38.
41. See Ralph C. Nash, Reforming the Procurement Process: Part 2-Additional Issues, 7
NASH & CIBINIc REP. 12, 34 (Mar. 1993).
42. For example, as the Engineer Contracting Instructions (the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers supplement to the FAR) evolved into the Engineer Federal Acquisition Regu-
lation Supplement, drafters responded to the Section 800 Panel and trimmed the volume
from two inches to less than one inch in thickness.
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multiple levels of competition43 and partnering. The review revealed that
misuse occurred mostly in the drafting of overly broad work statements and
issuance of task orders that exceeded the scope of the original contract. De-
spite these findings, the panel supported continued use of task order con-
tracting as an important means of allowing the flexibility needed to contract
for prospective work.
Recognizing the balance of interests required to properly implement
indefinite quantity contracts, the panel recommended Congress enact a
new statutory provision identifying procedures for awarding such contracts
through competitive negotiations.44 The panel expected this proposed lan-
guage to help normalize already widely used indefinite delivery contracts
without detracting from their flexibility. The panel viewed this guidance as
a positive step toward standardizing task order contracting. 4 To this day, the
contracting community continues to await the institutionwide guidance
needed to improve indefinite delivery contracting.
B. SWAT Team Report
In 1992, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a more
limited, civilian agency version of the Section 800 Panel, known as the
SWAT Team on Civilian Agency Contracting, which focused primarily on
43. Contractors compete once for the contract and a second time for the task order.
See FAR 16.505.
44. The panel's recommended procedures are as follows:
(1) When a contract is awarded ... but does not procure or specify a firm quantity of
supplies or services (other than a minimum or maximum quantity), such contract
... may provide for the issuance of delivery orders or task orders....
(2) Provided that a contract described in paragraph (1) complies with the requirements
[below] and with regulations issued pursuant to paragraph (5), the delivery orders
or task orders under such contract shall not [require separate notice or competition].
(3) Contracts to which the provisions of paragraph (2) apply shall-
(A) be awarded as a result of a solicitation for which the notice ... reasonably
and fairly describes the general scope, magnitude, and duration of the pro-
posed contract in a manner that would reasonably permit a potential offeror to
decide whether to request a solicitation and consider submitting an offer;
(B) specify in the solicitation and contract the period of the contract.., and the
maximum quantity or dollar value....
(C) both in the solicitation and contract, reasonably describe in the statement of
work, specifications, or other description, the general scope, nature, complexity,
and purpose of the supplies or services to be procured under the contract;
(5) The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations to implement this paragraph ...
and shall provide for appropriate audit and oversight.
DoD ACQUISITION L. ADvIsoRY PANEL REP., STREAMLINING DEFENSE AcQuIsITION LAWS
§ 1-51 (1993) (emphasis added).
45. See Nash, supra note 41, at 35.
reforming management controls for cost-reimbursement contracts. 46 This task
force again discussed indefinite delivery contracts in mixed terms of support
and caution. The SWAT team's report identified the following significant
problems in the use of such contracts: inadequate definitions of agency needs
in the solicitation's statement of work; frequent failure to prepare indepen-
dent government cost estimates; procurement of inherently governmental
functions, such as contract management; the appearance of improper per-
sonal services contract relationships between contractors and government
personnel; and the use of cost-reimbursement contracts to procure follow-on
work from the same contractor.47 Generally, the SWAT team pointed to agen-
cies' inattention to management issues such as guidance, training, and re-
sources as the cause for contract administration failings. The report con-
cluded that while contracting professionals need flexibility to do their jobs
efficiently, their contract administration responsibilities must be clearly de-
fined. At a congressional hearing announcing the SWAT team report's re-
lease, the committee chairman heralded the SWAT team report as a "good
jumping off point for the Clinton administration to address the real problems"
in federal procurement and "save billions of taxpayer dollars."48
C. National Performance Review
The following year, in 1993, former Vice President Al Gore's National
Performance Review (NPR) reported on reinventing government in "From
Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs
Less."49 Among the reforms designed to streamline Government were nu-
merous recommendations and "action items," with great emphasis on grant-
ing increased authority and empowerment to procurement personnel and
46. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE SWAT TEAM
ON CIVILIAN AGENCY CONTRACTING: IMPROVING CONTRACTING PRACTICES AND MAN-
AGEMENT CONTROLS ON COsT-TYPE FEDERAL CONTRACTS (Dec. 3,1992); Nash, supra note
38 at 18. See also EPA's Poor Oversight of Contractor Discussed Before Senate, House Panels,
57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) at 381, Mar. 9, 1992.
47. See OMB SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 46, at 23; Cheryl Lee Sandner and Mary
Ita Snyder, Multiple Award Task and Delivery Order Contracting: A Contracting Primer, 30
PUB. CONT. L.J. 461, 465 (2001).
48. Dingell Presses for Aggressive Implementation of SWAT Team Reforms, 34 Gov'T CON-
TRACTOR 721, at 3 (Dec. 9, 1992). A GAO official also testified to support the report
findings and reiterate the GAO's position that more reforms were needed. Among the
areas GAO identified as most in need of reform were "excessive [and costly] agency reli-
ance on contractors.., inefficient contract administration,... and a lack of management
accountability by top agency procuring officials ... " To implement necessary improve-
ments GAO suggested establishing guidelines instructing agencies to avoid overly broad
and vague statements of work and improve training for government procurement officials.
Id. at 4.
49. See John Cibinic, 'Streamlining' and 'Reinventing' Federal Procurement: Can the Red
Tape Be Cut? 7 NASH & CIBINIC REP. T 55 (Oct. 1993); National Performance Review
Issues Report, 35 GOV'T CONTRACTOR T 558, 3 (Sept. 15, 1993).
Indefinite Delivery Contract 395
Public Contract Law Journal * Vol. 3 1, No. 3 - Spring 2002
improving responsiveness to customer needs. The intent was to allow man-
agers to make needed purchases unhampered by red tape, while still adhering
to the fundamental procurement principles of integrity, openness, competi-
tion, and value. This would occur by shifting from "rigid rules" to "guiding
principles" and by increasing the discretion afforded contracting officials
while ensuring that they exercised their judgment properly when using in-
novative procurement methods such as indefinite delivery contracts. The
report presumed implementation of the Section 800 Panel's call for guidance,
but, as discussed below, effective guidance remains lacking and, as a result,
reform tempered by oversight has not been achieved.
D. Increased Discretion and Worforce Reduction
The "empowerment" theory is well articulated by Dr. Steven Kelman,
former administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP),
whose ideas coincided with the NPR initiatives.5 0 In his 1990 book, Kelman
prodded agencies to reduce the number of mandatory regulations and instead
entrust Contracting Officers with greater judgment and discretion.5 In criti-
cizing the present state of government procurement, Kelman commented that
the goals of equity, integrity, and economy, while easily translated into rules,
fail to account for quality. As a result, the Government is unable to get the
most for its money.52 Kelman theorized that limiting the number of rules that
bind procurement officials, and empowering them to use their own common
sense and judgment in selecting and working with vendors, would make pub-
lic sector contracting more like commercial contracting. The direct results
would be increased quality of procured goods and services as well as improved
professionalism within the acquisition workforce. s3 As OFPP administrator
for much of the 1990s, Kelman played a central role in the Clinton admin-
istration's procurement policy initiatives and attempted to effectuate his
themes. The Clinton administration's procurement reforms also urged civil-
ian agencies to focus on building an improved and innovative procurement
workforce1 4
The government-reinvention movement also strove to combine increased
50. Kelman served as OFPP administrator from 1993 to 1997, then returned to his post
at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. While at OFPP, Kelman "cham-
pioned a common sense and commercial-like procurement system" for Government. See
Kelman Will Be Remembered as Facilitator of Revolutionary Procurement Reform, 39 Gov'T
CONTRACTOR 444, 3 (Sept. 17, 1997). He is perhaps best known for rewriting FAR part
15 to broaden Contracting Officer discretion and emphasize contractor past performance.
See id.
51. See KELMAN, supra note 31.
52. See id. at 10, 14.
53. See id. at 89-91.




empowerment with full accountability.55 Congress intended the Defense Ac-
quisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)56 to improve the effective-
ness of the professional individuals who work within the defense acquisition
system. While policymakers recognized that improvements in the quality and
professionalism of the acquisition workforce would not guarantee perfection,
they expected the improvements to significantly boost individuals' ability to
implement the acquisition process more cost-effectively." A committee re-
port accompanying the Act highlighted the importance of structuring a ca-
reer program to develop highly qualified professional personnel.5s In practice,
personnel reforms emphasized educational requirements and the mechanical
enforcement of eighty hours' mandatory training every two years for acqui-
sition specialists.5 9 There does not appear to be a government methodology
in place to monitor how consistently and effectively these mandates are ful-
filled. Considering the staggering impacts of downsizing on the workload and
retention of remaining personnel, it appears that even when training takes
place, it may not be enough.
Time has shown that professionalism cannot be imposed through the pas-
sage of legislation. Just as Congress has been shortsighted regarding the value
of human capital, it has cut training and education funding first in times of
budget shortages. As a result, training standards are neither sufficient nor are
they adequately funded.60 The only effective means of improving business
practices is through an agency commitment to improving management and
providing guidance that incorporates model values and best practices. 61 An
effective balance between discretion and accountability demands an earnest
management commitment to improving the entire acquisition team and
equipping contracting personnel with the necessary business skills to add
value to the discussion among the diverse interests present. Successful inte-
gration of the acquisition team will require a solid foundation of regulatory
55. See Ralph C. Nash, An Efficient Procurement System: Striking a Balance Between
Freedom and Accountability, 9 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 30 (May 1995).
56. 10 U.S.C. § 1701 (1990).
57. See Discussion of the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ar/dawiadis.html.
58. See id., citing THE QUALITY AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE AcQuISITION WORK-
FORCE, May 8, 1990 (Committee Print No. 10).
59. Subject to certain exceptions, DAWIA requires acquisition personnel to complete
mandatory contracting courses, have at least two years' experience in a contracting po-
sition, and have a baccalaureate degree or twenty-four semester credit hours in busi-
ness/professional course work. See 10 U.S.C. § 1724. The statute also authorizes DoD to
establish a means of educating and maintaining a professional corps of acquisition officials.
See 10 U.S.C. § 1735. Among the specific requirements imposed as a result of the law is
a training requirement of eighty hours of training every two years.
60. See Michael F Miller, Redefining Acquisition Competencies & Programs of Instruction,
36 CONT. MGMT. 14 (July 1996).
61. See John Cibinic, Professionalism of the Procurement Workforce, 9 NASH & CIBINIC
REP. 50 (Sept. 1995).
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guidance and public service values. Only then is trust developed, thought
extended, and confidence restored. These issues will be further explored in
the Recommendations section below.
IV. Congress Enacts the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
On October 13, 1994, President Clinton signed FASA into law. 62 FASA
contemplates the repeal or substantial amendment of nearly 225 legal pre-
scriptions affecting the federal procurement system. 63 The Senate Govern-
ment Affairs Committee Report described the Act as "a comprehensive over-
haul of the federal procurement laws." 64 Members of the acquisition industry
heralded the legislation as ushering in "the most extensive changes in federal
government contracting" since implementation of CICA.61 In the arena of
indefinite delivery contracting, however, the Act simply legitimized an al-
ready popular contracting tool and set forth certain procedures regarding
its use.
A. An Analysis of FASA
FASA represented in large part an implementation of the Section 800
Panel's recommendations. Like the panel's scope of study, the Act's coverage
ranges widely, from adopting commercial-style contracting practices to re-
ducing administrative overhead to keeping pace with technological advance-
ments. As to indefinite delivery contracting, the panel strongly suggested the
need for authority and guidance. The plan was that finally government agen-
cies would have a set of rules to follow when using task and delivery orders.66
62. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat.
3243 (1994).
63. See Mark J. Lumer, The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, TOPICAL ISSUES
IN PROCUREMENT ISSUES 1 (Oct. 1994). In its 1,800-page report to Congress, the Section
800 Panel presented its analysis of 600 acquisition-related laws and recommended the
amendment or repeal of nearly 300 laws. See S. REP. No. 103-258 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 2561, 2563.
64. S. REP. No. 103-258, supra note 63, at 2561, 2563.
65. Lumer, supra note 63, at 10.
66. In the years leading up to FASA, GAO had tended to be fairly liberal in finding
agency task order descriptions to be within scope. It became clear why agencies described
task order contracts as the most practicable means to fulfill significant amounts of work.
In one instance, the Comptroller General denied a protester's allegation that a task order
for phase-in work was outside the scope of the original solicitation, which included fab-
rication, development, and "other efforts" determined necessary by the Contracting Of-
ficer. GAO held the task order reasonably fit within the latter task area, without com-
menting on the extreme breadth of its description. KMS Fusion, Inc., B-242529, May 8,
1991, 91 CPD q 447. In another protest, GAO held that the agency's broad statement
of needed services could reasonably be understood to encompass the allegedly out-of-scope
task order. However, the Comptroller General did comment that the Government must
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Contracting Officers govemmentwide are still waiting for this regulatory
guidance.
In its report accompanying FASA, the Senate Government Affairs Com-
mittee referred to a complex and unwieldy set of existing procurement rules
in need of reform to overcome frequent abuses such as cost overruns, in-
creased delays, and fraud.67 Sections 1004 and 1054 of the Act, which apply
to DoD and civilian agencies respectively, are intended to increase consis-
tency among DoD and civilian agencies and simplify matters for industry
members.68 They authorize agencies to enter into contracts for the procure-
ment of goods or services without specifying a firm quantity, other than a
minimum and a maximum. These contracts are defined as task order con-
tracts when the procurement is for services and delivery order contracts when
the procurement is for goods. 69 Contract performance is executed through
the agency's issuance of orders for work described in the solicitation's state-
ment of work.
Under FASA sections 1004 and 1054, solicitations for task and delivery
orders are required to include the duration of the contract, the maximum
quantity or value, and a statement of work that "reasonably describes the
general scope, nature, complexity and purposes of the services or property to
be procured under the contract."70 Agency heads are authorized to award
single or multiple award task or delivery order contracts, but the statute
establishes a preference for awarding multiple award contracts to the maxi-
mum extent practicable.7" Moreover, a task or delivery order cannot itself
increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which
it was issued. This can be accomplished only by modifying the underlying
contract.72 A separate section of FASA addresses task order contracting for
advisory and assistance services.73
have a legitimate reason to bundle so many diverse requirements together under a single
contract to avoid unduly limiting competition. See Astronautics Corp. of America,
B-242782, June 5, 1991, 91-1 CPD T 531.
67. See S. REP. No. 103-258, supra note 63, at 2561, 2563.
68. See id. at 2572; William T. Woods, FASA: How Much Reform Did We Get?, 30
PROCUREMENT LAW. 11 (1995).
69. See Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 1004 (1994) (implemented at 10 U.S.C. § 2304d).
70. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304a(b).
71. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304a(d).
72. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304a(e).
73. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304b. The Section 800 Panel had not contemplated distinct
treatment of advisory and assistance services. (This generally refers to consulting services
and may include support services for acquisition officials.) However, the statute imposes
stricter limitations and requirements on this type of contract. The period of a task order
contract for advisory and assistance services is limited to five years including options or
modifications. Moreover, multiple awards are required on such contracts that extend
longer than three years and exceed $10 million. See Anthony Gamboa, Task and Delivery
Orders: Problematic Requirements Under FASA, 31 PROCUREMENT LAw. 15 (Fall 1995). The
stricter terms may have been implemented in reaction to a 1991 DoDIG Audit that found
that DoD had failed to establish an effective policy for advisory and assistance contracting
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FASA also sets forth basic requirements for the issuance of orders. Separate
notice in the Commerce Business Daily is not mandated when an agency plans
to award a task order. In a multiple award situation, however, all awardees
must be given a "fair opportunity" to be considered for each order in excess
of $2,500.14 Protests are not authorized in connection with the issuance of
an order except when the ground for protest is that the order exceeds the
scope of the underlying contract. 7s To provide the oversight otherwise in-
herent in the bid protest process, the statute requires the agency head to
appoint a task and delivery order ombudsman. 76 These basic provisions clearly
reflect Congress's heavy reliance on the Section 800 Panel's report.
B. Legislative History
The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Report on FASA used a
cautionary tone to describe task and delivery contracting and proscribed po-
tential abuses, similar to concerns first raised by the Section 800 Panel. The
report warned: "The indiscriminate use of task order contracts for broad cate-
gories of ill-defined services unnecessarily diminishes competition and results
in the waste of taxpayer dollars. '77 The report also underscored the value of
providing "reasonable consideration" to all multiple awardees as a means of
ensuring cost effectiveness without "significantly burdening the procurement
system." 8 Congressional authorization of the indefinite delivery contracting
tool, the report explained, was intended to grant agencies broad discretion
in establishing procedures for the evaluation and award of task orders under
multiple award contracts. 79 CICA's procedural requirements were lifted to
give agency officials wide latitude to choose the most appropriate evaluation
factors and techniques for a particular project.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's separate report agreed that the
legislation's goal was to give procurement officials flexibility to implement
acquisition reform rather than establish additional statutory procedures.
However, the committee recognized that this increased empowerment might
with indefinite quantity contracts and options and recommended they be discontinued
and replaced with fixed-price contracts and presolicitation conferences to identify small
businesses. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUDIT
REPORT No. 91-041, CONTRACTED ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE SERVICES CONTRACTS
(Feb. 1, 1991).
74. See Pub. L. No. 103-355 § 1004 (1994) (implemented at 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(a) &
(b)).
75. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(d).
76. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e). The ombudsman, although rarely used in practice, is
putatively responsible for reviewing contractor complaints and ensuring fair opportunity
for all contractors.




tempt some contracting officials to rely on large, established businesses to
supply goods and services. It promised to work with the Committee on Small
Business and the Committee on Governmental Affairs to oversee the imple-
mentation of FASA to ensure that it would enhance the ability of small
disadvantaged businesses to compete for task and delivery order contracts.
80
Regrettably, this well-intentioned teaming failed to come to fruition.
From the date FASA was issued, observers called for regulatory guidelines
that would anticipate and minimize potential problems in the use of task and
delivery contracts."' FAR Case 94-711 provided basic implementation of
FASA with only minimal guidance from the FAR Council. 2 Aside from
implementing the terms of the statute, the only additional prescribed guide-
lines were that Contracting Officers should exercise "sound business judg-
ment" and "broad discretion." 3 The new regulations failed to address many
of the troubling issues arising from the combination of widened discretion
and a contracting tool with nearly unlimited potential. The FAR Council's
initial revision of subpart 16.5 failed to meaningfully assist the procurement
workforce to implement reform policy in a reasoned, effective manner.84
Despite the initial reaction that FASA represented a sea change in the
world of federal procurement, the drafters themselves recognized the Act was
"but the first step towards comprehensive acquisition reform. There are many
aspects of the acquisition process ... that require management changes
within the Executive Branch rather than more statutes.""5 The principles of
empowerment and streamlining simply have not lived up to their early bill-
ing. Promised guidance never materialized. Overworked, understaffed con-
tracting offices exercise their discretion by taking the path of least resistance
and sole-sourcing orders rather than investing the hard thinking necessary
to create a responsible framework for evaluation and award.
The key to nurturing a reform movement rooted in the empowerment of
its contracting personnel is to encourage and equip those individuals to will-
ingly accept and exercise that new freedom. Time has shown that Contract-
ing Officers need and seek guidance before they can wield their discretion
responsibly. Procurement reform legislation has failed to address this problem.
Increased attention to the management of the acquisition workforce and
some level of restraint in the exercise of indefinite delivery contracts are
needed in order to get effective reform back on track.
80. See S. REP. No. 103-259 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2598, 2603.
81. See Peter J. Ritenburg, Task Order Contracts: Popular and Now 'Legal,' but New FAR
Coverage Should Address Potential Problems, 26 NAT'L CONT. MGMT. J. 10 (1995).
82. See 60 Fed. Reg. 49,723 (Sept. 26, 1995).
83. Id. at 49726, § 16.505(b).
84. See Vernon J. Edwards, The New Rules for Multiple Award Task Order Contracting,
9 NASH & CIBINic REP. ' 35 (June 1995).
85. S. REP. No. 103-259, supra note 80, at 2598, 2603.
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V. Repeated Criticisms of Indefinite Delivery Contracting Practices
Mandate Improvements
Many embraced the red tape reduction and streamlined procedures of ac-
quisition reform, despite early warnings, as a tremendous cost- and timesaving
improvement. Kelman called initiatives such as increased indefinite delivery
contracts and govemmentwide acquisition contracts (GWACs) "common
sense approaches to procurement that save the taxpayer money and the Gov-
ernment time and other valuable resources. 8 6 There is, however, an ominous
side to the combined raising of restrictions, empowerment of Contracting
Officers, and "monitoring" rather than "managing" of contractor perfor-
mance.87 The following section will chronicle the major areas of concern
that have developed as discretion widened and regulation waned.
One of the most apparent dangers of the movement to increase Contract-
ing Officer discretion is the resulting tendency to equate regulatory silence
with consent.88 Among its efforts to encourage the use of innovative con-
tracting techniques to improve government practices, the FAR Council is-
sued a revision to FAR subsection 1.102. It provides that where a procure-
ment "strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in the best interests of the
Government and is not addressed in the FAR" nor proscribed by statute, ex-
ecutive order or regulation, it can be implemented in keeping with the spirit
of innovative practices.8 9 This text summarizes the spirit of a streamlined
FAR that trades wordy guidance for broadened Contracting Officer discre-
tion. However, Contracting Officers under unrealistic pressures have cited
this provision to justify expedited practices that limit competition. Contract-
ing Officers will cut comers when overwhelmed by customer demands and
desperately turn to indefinite delivery contracts to accomplish assignments
with minimal planning, preparation, and competition. While the FAR en-
courages near unrestrained Contracting Officer discretion, the lack of guid-
ance clearly transgresses the FASA drafters' intent.
A. The Valenzuela Protest and the Dangers to Small Businesses of Limited
Competilion
When Contracting Officers choose to ignore alternatives that encourage
competition in favor of more efficient means, it is often small businesses that
bear the greatest consequences. Anticompetitive practices led to increased
86. Agencies Seek to Increase Small Business Participation in Task Order Contracts, 68 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 5 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at http://pubs.bna.com.
87. Craig Olson, From Cradle to Save: Revolutionary Acquisition Force Structure Alter-
natives for the 21st Century, AcQuIsITION REV. Q. 165, 169 (Spring 2000).
88. See Ralph C. Nash, Breakthroughs in Acquisition Reform, 9 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
T 52 (Sept. 1995).
89. FAR 1.102 (d) (emphasis added).
-40C) _
Comptroller General scrutiny, to the extent such review is within GAO's
limited jurisdiction to hear bid protests arising out of task orders. 90
In response to a protest by Valenzuela Engineering, Inc. ,91 the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers alleged it had conducted acquisition planning consistent
with FAR 7.103, to include a thorough internal discussion of issues such as
competition procedures and small business participation, prior to issuing a
request for proposals (RFP) in support of the Operation and Maintenance
Engineering Enhancement (OMEE) Program.9 The agency awarded two in-
definite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts under this solicitation.
One of the contracts was for operation and maintenance (O&M) and inci-
dental repair and replacement services for designated facilities, at an esti-
mated value of $26.5 million. Originally, the Corps intended the scope of
work to cover only emergency repair of medical facilities, but the solicitation
was not so restricted. Instead, it contemplated provision of "O&M contract-
ing support for Army and Air Force activities on a world-wide basis. ''93
Valenzuela, a small business, held an Air Force 8(a) contract 94 for O&M
services at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB). For reasons unrelated to Valenzuela's
capability, the Air Force deleted certain engineering and construction tasks
from its contract. Subsequently, the Corps issued the RFP for its OMEE IDIQ
contract. No small businesses or 8(a) firms submitted offers in response.
Sometime after the Corps awarded two contracts to large businesses, the Air
Force decided it would not exercise the option on Valenzuela's contract.
Rather, without coordinating with the Small Business Administration (SBA)
or considering whether the work was appropriate for a small business set-
aside, the Air Force determined it could more efficiently satisfy its require-
ments at Nellis AFB through one of the Corps' two task order contracts.9
90. See FAR 16.505(a)(6).
91. Valenzuela Eng'g, Inc., B-277979, Jan. 26, 1998, 98-1 CPD (1 51.
92. The OMEE program had four objectives: (1) to enhance the operation and main-
tenance (O&M) of new and existing complex facilities by developing maintenance con-
cepts and system requirements; (2) to provide assistance to develop systems and equipment
inventories and to identify system and equipment deficiencies and remediation; (3) to
provide experts to identify requirements for the upgrade of life safety and critical systems
to enhance public safety and to ensure accreditation of health care facilities; and (4) to
provide contracting support for OMEE program participants. Information Paper provided
by senior agency attorney.
93. Valenzuela Eng'g, 98-1 CPD 5 51, at *2. The solicitation had originally stated the
services would be provided "in the continental United States, Hawaii and Alaska," but
was later modified to include the statement "and outside the continental United States."
Id. at *22.
94. See section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1994), authorizing
the SBA to contract with government agencies and establish performance via subcontracts
with socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns. Valenzuela quali-
fied as such a business.
95. In practical terms, the Air Force requested, pursuant to the Economy Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1535, that the Corps administer O&M services at Nellis AFB. The Air Force
made the request under a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), which
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Valenzuela filed a GAO protest against the award of a delivery order. The
Corps and the Air Force countered that the protest was untimely because
the Air Force had notified Valenzuela a full month earlier of its intent to
acquire O&M services at Nellis AFB from another contractor.96 The Comp-
troller General agreed the protest was untimely, but accepted Valenzuela's
request to "consider the issues raised as significant to the procurement system"
by writing letters of concern to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air
Force.
The Comptroller General's letters addressed whether the existing system
of soliciting IDIQ contracts conflicted with the Small Business Act. In a
letter to GAO, filed as supplemental comments to the Corps' agency report,
the SBA explained that when an agency seeks to fulfill under another
agency's contract a requirement that was not contemplated in the statement
of work, the procuring agency "must conduct the relevant small business
inquiry in accordance with FAR Subpart 19.5."97 It appeared contracting
officials, in exercising their discretion, deliberately circumvented small busi-
ness regulations and policy.
In its letter to the Air Force Secretary, the Comptroller General identified
two statutory violations caused by the overly broad statement of work: (1) the
Air Force's failure to coordinate the removal of the Nellis AFB requirement
from the small business program and consider the requirement for a small
business set-aside in compliance with the Small Business Act and (2) the
failure to achieve full and open competition under CICA. The GAO was
unconvinced by the Air Force's assertion that the Corps' approach was "more
cost effective than initiating a new acquisition process" and dismissed it as
insufficient justification for avoiding compliance with the FAR requirement
for SBA review.98 The Air Force's attempt to circumvent the FAR in the
interest of time and cost efficiency was simply unacceptable.
The Valenzuela letters also suggested the Government's tendency to com-
bine large, diverse work requirements under a single contract restricted mean-
ingful competition and encouraged contract bundling. SBA's response to
GAO's request for comment contended that the inclusion of the Nellis AFB
requirement in the USACE O&M contract met the definition of contract
bundling.99 According to SBA, the consolidation makes "small business
authorized both the transfer of funds from the Air Force to the Corps and the issuance of
delivery orders by the Corps.
96. Under the GAO Bid Protest Regulations, a protest must be filed within ten cal-
endar days after the protester knew or should have known of the basis of protest. See 4
C.FR. § 21.2 (a)(2) (2000).
97. Letter from David R. Kohler, Associate General Counsel for General Law, Small
Business Administration, to Charles Morrow, Office of General Counsel, U.S. General
Accounting Office at 2 (Nov. 14, 1997) (on file with author).
98. Valenzuela Eng'g, Inc., B-277979, Jan. 26, 1998, 98-1 CPD 1 51 at Comptroller
General Letter to Air Force Secretary F Whitten Peters (Jan. 26, 1998).
99. See Letter from David R. Kohler, Associate General Counsel for General Law, Small
Business Administration, to Robert Murphy, General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting
Office at 5 (Oct. 28, 1997). "Bundling" is defined as "consolidating two or more
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prime contract participation unlikely" by grouping geographically diverse re-
quirements.10 Moreover, when it bundled the Nellis AFB requirements, the
Corps overlooked its obligation to report the bundlingI°l and denied SBA
the opportunity to recommend means of preventing small business exclusion.
In its letter to the Army, GAO described the Corps' IDIQ contract as so
broad as to be inconsistent with the requirements defining appropriate use
of task order contracts at 10 U.S.C. § 2304a and in CICA.10 The Comp-
troller General further noted that "an overly broad statement of work can
unjustifiably diminish competition just as bundling does, by deterring busi-
nesses, particularly small businesses, from competing for a contract, notwith-
standing their ability to perform some of the work at issue."10
GAO's letter cited the very language Congress used in its 1994 report on
FASA, warning that "indiscriminate use of task order contracts for broad
categories of ill-defined services unnecessarily diminishes competition and
results in the waste of taxpayer dollars." 1 4 The Senate Government Affairs
Committee's premonitions had been realized: overreliance on Contracting
Officer judgment, combined with the FAR Council's failure to provide ex-
press guidance had denied Valenzuela the opportunity to compete.
Two years after Valenzuela, Congress asked GAO to review whether ac-
quisition reform had actually reduced small businesses' opportunity to com-
pete for government contracts. 10 In GAO interviews, representatives of small
business associations identified the codification of indefinite delivery con-
tracts and multiple award preference as reforms that had adversely impacted
small businesses by creating the potential for grouping multiple agencies'
needs and work statements that covered a large, geographically diverse
area. 1°6 Small businesses lacked experience with such large, nationwide con-
tracts and stood no realistic chance of competing for them.
The GAO report also notes that despite various, new streamlining efforts
designed to broaden Contracting Officers' discretion to find innovative ways
of doing more with less, SBA and GSA statistics showed "small businesses
received a higher share in fiscal year 1999 of expenditures on new contracts
over $25,000 for most categories of goods and services than they did in fiscal
year 1993."107 In addition, expenditures to small business under multiple
requirements for supplies or services, previously provided or performed under separate
smaller contracts, into a solicitation for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable
for award to a small business concern due to" size, dollar value, geographical diversity, or
any combination of such. FAR 2.101.
100. See Kohler Letter, supra note 99.
101. The Small Business Act, as amended in 1993, and FAR 19.202-1(e) require
agency reporting.
102. See Valenzuela Eng'g, 98-1 CPD T 51.
103. Id.
104. S. REP. No. 103-258 (1994), supra note 63, at 2561, 2576.
105. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, SMALL BUSINESS: TRENDS IN FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT IN THE 1990s at 3 (Jan. 2001).
106. See id. at 4.
107. Id. at 6.
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award contracts increased from $524 million in FY94 to $2 billion in FY99
and expenditures to small businesses for IDIQs from FY94 to FY99 remained
consistent at $7 billion.108 While GAO did not find any quantifiable negative
effect of procurement reform on small businesses, the report raised awareness
of the effects increased Contracting Officer discretion can have on small
business.
GAO issued a separate report in early 2000, concluding that because of
limited agency reporting, insufficient governmentwide data exist on the level
of contract bundling and its impact on small businesses.I°9 GAO's analysis of
data in the Federal Procurement Data System, however, dispelled concerns
raised by the SBA's Office of Advocacy that federal agencies had fallen short
of meeting the govemmentwide goal of awarding 23 percent of prime con-
tracts to small businesses. 11°
Overall, though, GAO's review of procurement activities at three agencies
showed that consolidation of contracts by agencies seeking to streamline their
buying resulted in reduced numbers of contractors and contract dollars. "Of-
ficials at the three sites reviewed believed that contract bundling had, at
most, a limited effect on the share of contracts and contract dollars awarded
to small businesses." In response, the SBA pledged to create a system for
monitoring contract bundling. Again, while not conclusive, these reports
suggest the exercise of Contracting Officers' discretion can be tempered by
requiring them to provide reasoned justification for any decision to group
distinct work descriptions under a single solicitation.' 1
Notwithstanding the statistical results of GAO's reports, the most im-
mediate effect of restricted competition appears to be on small businesses'
ability to participate. Valenzuela's toothless protest highlighted FASA's ef-
fective silencing of small businesses, which are often unable to protest an
agency's failure to abide by the law. Under the circumstances, it was highly
unlikely Valenzuela would learn the Army had issued a task order solicitation
that might include the work it was performing at Nellis AFB."2 Only by
chance could Valenzuela have realized it might be displaced in time to file a
preaward protest capable of yielding a meaningful result. The Comptroller
General recognized that "no potential offeror could reasonably have antici-
pated, when the task order contracts were initially being competed, what
108. See id. at 20.
109. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, SMALL BuSINESS: LIMITED INFOR-
MATION AVAILABLE ON CONTRACT BUNDLING'S EXTENT AND EFFECTS (Mar. 2000).
110. This goal reflects the percentage of the total dollar value of federal prime con-
tractors that are considered small. Because there are no reporting requirements for credit
card purchases, which account for 5 percent of all procurements, small business's com-
petition statistics account for only 95 percent of the pie. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE REPORT, supra note 105, at 21-22.
111. See Ritenburg, supra note 81, at 4.
112. See GAO Tells Air Force, Army Vague, Overbroad Work Statement Violates Com-
petition Law, 69 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 228-29 (Mar. 2, 1998).
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specific facilities and services would be actually provided under the con-
tracts."'13 GAO called this displacement of small businesses "one of the prob-
lems associated with overly broad work statements.""' 4 More problems will
arise if Congress and the administration do not recognize the implications of
reduced competition and Contracting Officers' tendency to trade competi-
tion for efficiency.
B. A Troubled Silence: FASA's Bar Against Bid Protests Challenging Task
and Delivery Orders
Displacement, however, is only one facet of reduced competition. In ad-
dition, disappointed offerors are barred by statute from filing a protest against
the award of a task order.'"5 GAO consistently has held that FASA generally
precludes protests against task order awards except when the task order ex-
pands the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the
order is authorized." 6 The only additional ground for jurisdiction GAO has
read into the FASA rule is when the agency's actions create a mandatory
down-select among multiple awardees, removing an awardee from consider-
ation for future task orders." 7
113. See Valenzuela Eng'g, Inc., B-277979, Jan. 26, 1998, 98-1 CPD 51 at *26.
114. Id. at **25-26.
115. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108
Stat. 3243 (1994) (as implemented at FAR subpart 16.5).
116. See 41 U.S.C. § 253j(d) and 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(d). See, e.g., Makro Janitorial
Services, B-282690, August, 18, 1999, 99-2 CPD 39 (task order to obtain services not
reasonably provided for in the original solicitation held improper, should have been pro-
cured through full and open competition); Ervin & Assoc., B-278850, Mar. 23, 1998,
98-1 CPD % 89 (sustaining a protest that alleged a task order for performance of a dem-
onstration program was out of scope even though the solicitation contemplated a "broad
range" of services, in part because such a program was not authorized at the time of award);
Floro & Assoc., B-285451.3, B-285451.4, Oct. 5, 2000, 2000 CPD 172 (task order for
management support found materially different from that reasonably contemplated by the
IDIQ contract for noncomplex integration services).
117. See, e.g., Electro-Voice, Inc., B-278319, B-278319.2, Jan. 15, 1998, 98-1 CPD
T 23 (holding the practice of down-selecting among contractors, so that all but the se-
lected contractor are eliminated from receiving more task orders under the contract, is
antithetical to FASA's intent that multiple award task ordering promote an ongoing
competitive environment); Corel Corp., B-283862, Nov. 18, 1999, 99-2 CPD 90; (the
Comptroller General dismissed a protest alleging the Department of Labor's decision to
issue a delivery order under another agency's IDIQ contract for Microsoft products was
tantamount to an improper sole sourcing, because it failed to argue the delivery order was
out of scope or implemented a "down-select," "regardless of the propriety of the issuing
agency's underlying determinations or conduct (absent certain exceptions not applicable
here)."); The Intrados Group, B-280130, June 22, 1998, 98-1 CPD 168 (in dismissing
the protest, the Comptroller General explains the exception to the protest restriction for
"down-selections" does not apply where the Government bundles multiple task orders
into a single task order, without foreclosing the protester's ability to bid on future task
orders); United Information Systems, Inc., B-282895, B-282896, June 22, 1999, 99-1
CPD 115 (dismissing protest filed by a multiple awardee that alleged the agency selected
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In the past eight years, GAO has experienced a significant decline in
protest filings. The proliferation of indefinite delivery task order contracts
has been suggested as among the likely causes.'1 8 If so, this would be an
unfortunate secondary effect of procurement streamlining. Well-founded bid
protests clarify regulations, enforce procurement laws, ensure a sense of fair
dealing, and provide meaningful deterrence of statutory and regulatory vio-
lations. 1' 9 The preservation of these seminal values well justifies the expen-
diture of resources in the pursuit and defense of bid protests. 20
Procurement reform shifted the orientation focus from competition to ef-
ficiency. With limited access to protest forums, offerors might be less willing
to take the risk associated with competing."' More than an oversight mech-
anism, the bid protest system is the most efficient method of policing the
contract formation process. For a thorough discussion of the risks associated
with limited bid protest rights, see Michael Benjamin's article Multiple Award
Task and Delivery Order Contracts: Expanding Protest Grounds and Other Her-
esies in this issue of the Journal.
C. GAO Provides Transparency and Accountability Despite the Bar Against Protests
In two bid protests, GAO construed the statutory restriction on protests
narrowly and addressed task order contracting issues. In Ocuto Blacktop &
Paving Co., Inc. 122 and N&N Travel & Tours, Inc.,'2 1 GAO held the statutory
bar on protests against task orders does not apply where the protest in essence
raises a question regarding the underlying solicitation. GAO arguably over-
reached its statutory jurisdiction to review cases where small businesses were
restricted from competition. These noteworthy opinions indicate GAO is
a task order contract to circumvent CICA and avoid GAO review, because the bar on
protests is part of FASA, not a matter of agency discretion, and the protester was given
an opportunity to compete). See also AudioCARE Systems, B-283985, Jan. 31, 2000, 2000
CPD 24 (holding the statutory restriction on protests does not apply when a competition
for issuance of a delivery order is held between an IDIQ contract holder and an offeror
outside the IDIQ contract).
118. See Steven L. Schooner, Who's Watching Now?, LEGAL TMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at
S27.
119. See Joseph J. Petrillo, Comments on the May 1998 Issue, 12 NASH & CIBiNiC REP.
T 47 (Aug. 1998).
120. Ralph Nash has taken the position in his monthly report that "protests 'disrupt
the procurement process' and 'waste the participants' resources.' " While he recognizes
that protests often provide assurance that laws are followed, in the vast number of cases
it is the public that benefits more than the protester itself. Ralph C. Nash, Comments on
the May 1998 Issue, 12 NASH & CIBINic REP. 1 47 (Aug. 1998). The Valenzuela protest
is the perfect example of a case that yielded the legally right outcome, but provided no
direct justice to the protester. With such results more likely in bundled contracts, one can
understand why potential offerors have filed fewer protests against indefinite delivery
contracts.
121. See Schooner, supra note 118, at S27.
122. B-284165, Mar. 1, 2000, 2000 CPD ( 32.
123. B-285164.2, B-285164.3, Aug. 31, 2000, 2000 U.S. Comp. Gen. 128.
-408
Indefinite Delivery Contract -40C
aware of the potential for lawlessness in indefinite delivery contracting and
is asserting its authority to provide accountability.
In another recent case, however, GAO limited the "insufficient notice"
exception, dismissing a small business protest contesting the Corps' issuance
of a task order for hospital housekeeping services at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
under an IDIQ contract for O&M services at government medical facilities.12 4
Hospital Klean, which held a Fort Bragg housekeeping contract, alleged the
task order was outside the scope of the original contract and should have been
set aside for 8(a) concerns. The Comptroller General found the allegation es-
sentially challenged the underlying IDIQ contract.
Comparing its circumstances to the Valenzuela case, Hospital Klean argued
the statement of work was overly broad and complained it could not reason-
ably have known the agency intended to issue an order solely for house-
keeping services under any of the multiple award contracts. The Comptroller
General was unconvinced and noted the solicitation properly and specifically
enumerated all the services the agency might order, to include housekeeping
services. Thus, the solicitation had put Hospital Klean on notice of its need
to file a protest before proposals were due.
The Comptroller General's decision to base its Hospital Klean holding on
the premise that a broad, nationwide solicitation put firms on notice to file
a preaward protest is troubling. GAO has effectively warned small businesses
to be alert for solicitations issued anywhere in the country listing general
requirements that might potentially overlap with work they presently per-
form. The distinction between Hospital Klean and Ocuto or N&N Travel is a
matter of how well the agency manages to specify projects contemplated
under a potentially expansive, nationwide contract. These recent cases sug-
gest that GAO grants a voice only to protesters when the statement of work
in the underlying IDIQ contract solicitation is impossibly vague or the Gov-
ernment misled the firm.
Notably, the Court of Federal Claims (COFC), which is now the sole
federal court to share bid protest authority with the GAO,125 has heard very
few bid protests filed against task and delivery order awards. In one recent
case, the protester contested the Navy's sole-source award of training flight
services under a competitively awarded IDIQ contract. 12 6 The court reasoned
the protest was not barred as a challenge to the Government's actions in
awarding a task order because the real issue was the Air Force's issuance of
a modification to the underlying Navy contract. The court held the contract's
work statement, which contemplated worldwide aircraft training services, was
broad enough to allow the agency to avoid competing a modification for
124. See Hospital Klean, Inc., B-286791, Dec. 8, 2000, 2000 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS
179.
125. On December 31, 2000, the sun set on district courts' authority to decide bid
protests under their so-called Scanwell jurisdiction. Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424
F2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
126. See Phoenix Air Group, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. CI. 90 (2000).
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work in the Far East and Hawaii. The court's opinion devoted several pages
to describing the agency's numerous attempts to overcome funding problems
and award a contract for services in the Far East and Hawaii. The court,
however, failed to comment on the huge scope of the Navy's worldwide
contract.
The COFC recently took jurisdiction over a disappointed offeror case,
unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that Federal Supply Schedule
(FSS) orders are not protestable under FASA. 127 The record showed the
Immigration and Naturalization Service held a competitive source selection
designed to select an offeror with a GSA FSS contract, thereby engaging in
a more extensive selection process than that contemplated by the FSS system.
The court held that when an agency goes beyond the simplified process of
placing an order against an existing FSS contract, a disappointed bidder may
challenge the award under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(a). 12 s This interpretation of FASA and FAR part 16 may prove to
be a chink in the armor of the barrier against task order bid protests. It
qualifies the "arbitrary and capricious" rule broadly and is difficult to refute
as an unreasonable standard.
If firms were to consider that they have little chance of filing successful
protests against IDIQ contracts of enormous scope, they would likely quit
filing. Fewer protests would translate to less precedent on which offerors and
agencies alike could rely for consistent clarification of statutes and regula-
tions.129 Protests also offer lessons learned that must be shared among all
participants in the procurement process so that practices can evolve and
improve. For the public at large, protests provide a window into the Gov-
ernment's fiscal practices.3 0 This transparency is essential to maintain public
confidence.
D. Poorly Estimated Quantities and the Loss of Contractor Faith
Successful multiple award IDIQ contracting relies in large part on con-
tractors continuing to submit their best proposals throughout the duration of
the contract. This can be an expensive proposition for contractors. Because
agencies often over- or underassess their estimates, the built-in maximum
and minimum quantities clause is intended to protect a contractor from being
forced to perform at a rate that exceeds its capacity or causes underperfor-
mance.31 A contractor can suffer costly losses, however, when the agency
identifies a nominal minimum, sole-sources orders to other multiple award-
127. Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 50 Ct. CI. 99 (2001).
128. See Ellsworth Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 388, 395-96 (1999).
129. See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike
Government, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 627, 702-05 (2001).
130. See Schooner, supra note 118, at S27.
131. See A. Jeff Ifrah, Under the Umbrella: Do the Rewards Justify the Risks?, LEGAL
TIMES, June 22, 1998, at S48.
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ees, or terminates before the contractor makes a return on its investment.
The Government cannot afford a reputation of doing business in bad faith.
Best value contracting is contingent on competition by all capable firms.132
Contracting Officers must uphold the principal values of integrity and trans-
parency to encourage full competition.
This section will focus on the increasing discouragement and disillusion-
ment among contractors that must accept poorly estimated quantities of work
and inflexible task order bidding rules as a result of the unreasonable con-
straints contracting personnel bear.
1. Estimated Quantities
Requiring offerors to submit price proposals for each task order grants the
Government the benefit of continuous competition and on the spot pricing,
while allowing the contractor to tailor its product or services to the needs of
each customer under the master contract. 3 Contractors, especially small
businesses, risk losing money, however, if required to submit expensive, spe-
cially priced proposals for every task order under a contract with a broadly
drafted, geographically diverse work statement. OFPP advises agencies to "be
mindful of the costs that contractors will incur to provide proposals ... in
response to requirements for task or delivery orders."'3 4 It further suggests
methods of improved cost effectiveness such as reducing the number of
awards under the master contract and allowing contractors to submit a "no
bid."'35 Agencies have implemented these comments only sparingly.136
The FAR has never required agencies to establish estimated quantities
when issuing IDIQ solicitations, primarily because such estimates are inher-
ently unreliable when it comes to indefinite delivery contracting. The Comp-
troller General, however, consistently has held that "a solicitation for an
indefinite quantity of services must contain estimates, since without them
the agency cannot compare proposals on an equal basis or ascertain which
offeror submitted the lowest overall cost."'3 When an agency has overesti-
mated its needs, rather than underutilize or allow the contract to become
hollow, Contracting Officers sometimes modify it to extend its duration,
without increasing price, to get full use of existing funding. Naturally, com-
petition suffers when such backhanded measures are taken. Not only does
the Government lose the opportunity to find a better price, but the contrac-
tor may be unable to recoup its costs or compete for another job.
132. See generally Department of Defense Directive No. 5000.1 4.3.3, Oct. 23, 2000.
133. See Ifrah, supra note 131, at S48.
134. Id. at S49, citing OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND BUDGET, BEST PRACTicEs FOR MULTIPLE AWARD TASK AND DELIVERY OR-
DER CONTRACT (interim ed. 1997), available at http://www.amet.gov/Library/OFPP/Best
Practices.
135. OFPP, supra note 134, at 18.
136. See Ifrah, supra note 131, at S48.
137. West Coast Copy, Inc., B-254044, Nov. 16, 1993, 93-2 CPD T 283.
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The COFC recently clarified the standard for determining government
liability regarding the accuracy of its estimates in indefinite quantity con-
tracts. The court held that when a contractor files suit against the Govern-
ment for breach of contract arising out of inaccurate estimates of work in an
indefinite delivery contract, the contractor must show "well nigh irrefragable
proof' to establish bad faith. 38 The day before the COFC released this opin-
ion, the Federal Circuit had issued a decision in a case of similar circum-
stances overturning the GSBCA's holding that contractors should not bear
the risk when misled by the Government.119
The facts of the Travel Centre case would make any government contractor
cringe. 40 GSA had awarded Travel Centre an indefinite delivery contract
estimated at $2.5 million for travel services in New England. Travel Centre
subsequently established a New England office and went to work, only to
learn from GSA that the estimate had included work for an agency that no
longer intended to procure under the GSA contract. When Travel Centre
shut down its new office to reduce costs, GSA terminated its contract. The
Federal Circuit's decision failed to mention the board's finding that GSA
had known four months before award that the award amount was overstated.
Instead, the court simply held the IDIQ contract had included a minimum
guarantee of $100 and, because Travel Centre made more than $100 under
the contract, the Government's contractual obligation was fulfilled.' 4'
138. Schweiger Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 188 (2001) (The court
refused to rely on the GSBCA's holding that a standard of "reckless negligence" was
appropriate, because that standard is more akin to the "negligence" standard under which
contractors can seek recovery for inaccurate government estimates in requirements
contracts.).
139. See Barram v. Travel Centre, 236 F3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).Travel Centre was
appealing the GSBCA's quantum decision, Travel Centre v. Gen. Servs. Admin., GSBCA
No. 14057, 99-2 BCA ' 30,521 (1999). That decision was founded on an earlier enti-
tlement decision, where the board held that GSA had breached its contract with Travel
Centre. See Travel Centre v. Gen. Servs. Admin., GSBCA No. 14057, 98-1 BCA
I 29,536 (1997).
140. See John W. Chierichella and Jonathan S. Aronie, Unwary Rabbits Beware: IDIQ
Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, Gov'T CONT. AUDIT REP. 16, 18 (Feb. 2001).
141. The ASBCA has held that a contractor can terminate for convenience even before
it orders the minimum quantity promised under the contract, so long as there is no showing
of bad faith or abuse of discretion. See Montana Refining Co., ASBCA No. 50515, 00-1
BCA ( 30,694 (1999). The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had awarded Montana
Refining an IDIQ contract for jet fuel, which estimated the quantity at 13.3 million gallons
and guaranteed purchase of about 10 million. The next year DLA partially terminated
the contract when it realized it had overestimated its needs and reduced the quantity to
10.2 million gallons. DLA ultimately purchased only 7.7 million gallons. When Montana
Refining filed a breach claim, the board rejected its argument that the Government's
failure to order the minimum quantity rendered the contract illusory. The board refused
to encroach on the Government's right to terminate contracts for convenience and saw
"no reason why indefinite quantity contractors are entitled to greater protection against
convenience terminations than other types of contractors." Id. at 151,627. If that is the
case, IDIQ contractors had best be wary. See also Whiter. Delta Constr. Int'l, Inc., CAFC
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When an agency establishes a minimum quantity that is only a nominal
amount, this also damages contractor confidence in the procurement system.
In many situations, there are minimal funds available at the time a multiple
award IDIQ contract is awarded, and that amount becomes the minimum
quantity. From this scenario emerge large, multimillion-dollar IDIQ contracts
over several years stating minimum quantities that might be less than 2 per-
cent of the overall projected cost. This vast imbalance can devastate busi-
nesses that spend large sums to bid for contracts with grand promises and
loaded work descriptions, only to have the contract hollowed by competing
multiple award contracts or flawed estimates.
Placing contractors on alert that "anyone who is dumb enough to rely on
the Government's promises deserves what he gets"'142 is no way for the Gov-
ernment to market its Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts to com-
petitive firms. When the Government loses the trust of companies that feel
they have been duped by clumsy estimates, a sense of heightened risk spreads
to other firms. Ultimately, taxpayers pay for this risk in the form of increased
CoSt. 143
2. Fair Opportunity to Compete
Industry members also have criticized agencies' inflexibility toward en-
forcing offerors' "fair opportunity" to compete. In many situations it may be
unjust to compel a master contract awardee to submit an offer for work it
cannot afford when the Government has other viable options. In a worst-
case scenario, failure to submit a proposal could lead to default damages and
jeopardize the government contractor's professional future. 144 Similarly, there
are circumstances in which it is reasonable for a Contracting Officer to use
his or her discretion to sole-source individual orders, as in instances where
only one offeror can perform specialized services. Industry members have
complained that agencies often inappropriately complete orders for which
direct assignment is a more economical and efficient solution. 14 They criti-
cize Contracting Officers who fail to use wise business judgment in admin-
istering the very contract type intended to encourage independent discretion.
In response to industry concerns about task order contract administration,
Steve Kelman, then-administrator of OFPP, issued a memorandum to senior
agency procurement officials urging them not to interpret the FAR's "fair
opportunity to be considered" language as a rigid mandate. Under contracts
for commercial off-the-shelf or information technology products, where the
No. 01-1253, ASBCA No. 52162, 01-1 BCA 1 31,195 (holding that when an IDIQ
contract is breached due to the government's failure to order the minimum, the contractor
is entitled to recover the amount of loss suffered as a result of the breach); Hermes Consol.,
Inc., ASBCA Nos. 52308, 52309, 2002 ASBCA LEXIS 11 (Feb. 15, 2002).
142. Travel Centre, 98-1 BCA T 29,536, at 150,714.
143. See Chierichella, supra note 140, at 18.
144. See Ifrah, supra note 131, at S48.
145. See Industry Group Outlines Concerns About New Rules for Task Order Contracts,
66 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at D-8 (Aug. 4,1996), available at http://pubs.bna.com.
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Contracting Officer already has information to evaluate which awardee can
provide the best value, requiring awardees to compete with each order could
cause an unnecessary burden.' 46 In such situations, Contracting Officers are
able to compare prices via price sheets and the awardees achieve a fair op-
portunity to compete when they post their products and prices. 147 A Con-
tracting Officer who uses well-reasoned discretion to instill flexibility in the
partnering relationship among task order contractors will find the "best
value" goal is better served.
Agencies must evaluate the benefits gained by using indefinite delivery
contracts on a case-by-case basis and recognize their limits in order to avoid
overestimating quantities and disillusioning offerors. 4s At the front end, ac-
curate estimates enable an agency to better conduct a competitive proposal
process and accurately measure the cost to the Government. A solicitation
might request prices of sample tasks149 or compute cost by extending unit
prices over estimated quantities. 0 During contract administration, Contract-
ing Officers must closely manage contractors as orders progress and contin-
uously update performance reports. When the contractor is at a remote site,
as is often the case with geographically disperse contracts, the contractor
might be able to identify earlier than the Government whether quantity
estimates are accurate.
Experience suggests, however, that Contracting Officers have a dangerous
tendency to rely on the contractor in large nationwide contracts where the
contract administration staff is small and often off-site. Contracting Officers
must be vigilant and recognize that the Government's interests often suffer
when the agency depends heavily on contractor perceptions without a bal-
anced perspective. 1 5 The Contracting Officer must recognize that streamlin-
146. See OFPP Tells Agencies They Need Not Compete Each Delivery Order Under Mul-
tiple Award Contracts for COTS Products, 66 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at D-4 (July
29, 1996), available at http://pubs.bna.com.
147. See id.
148. See John Cibinic, Task and Delivery Order Contracts: The Pot Is Boiling, 13 NASH
& CIBINIC REP. 18 (Mar. 1999).
149. See High Point Schaer, B-242616, B-242616.2, May 28, 1991, 91-1 CPD 509
(in a protest arising out of the procurement of litigation support services, the Comptroller
General found acceptable the agency's pricing of a hypothetical claim as a basis for cost
comparison because the sample task provided a common basis, requiring offerors to des-
ignate able disciplines); Aalco Forwarding, B-277241.15, Mar. 11, 1998, 98-1 CPD 87
(in contracting for moving services, the agency properly used the pricing of a sample
shipment of household goods as a cost comparison).
150. See West Coast Copy, B-254044, B-254044.2, Nov. 16, 1993, 93-2 CPD 9[ 283
(the Comptroller General sustained a protest against the agencies' comparison of unit
prices for various types of copying where it failed to factor in the quantities of labor used
in contract performance).
151. A GAO audit report concluded the Army should improve the way it evaluates
the costs of services provided and set specific performance goals for the contractor in an
enormous $2.2 billion service contract for troop support in the Balkans. GAO determined
the heart of the auditing problems was the lack of job training for contract employees
overseeing the cost reimbursement contract. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No.
.41,4
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ing ends at contract award, and therefore large scoped, nationwide IDIQ
contracts are often more complex, rather than easier, to administer than
traditional, fixed-price contracts.
E. The Balancing Act:. Do Multiple Awardees Have a Fair Opportunity to Compete
and Is the Government Getting the Full Benefit of the Multiple Award
Preference?
As discussed above, in creating a preference for multiple award indefinite
delivery contracts, Congress intended to afford "broad discretion" to Con-
tracting Officers in obtaining competition.5 2 The only established limitation
was that each of the multiple awardees be afforded "a fair opportunity to
compete." '53 Disheartenment develops when competitors sense that they
would not win a task order because the Contracting Officer favors an incum-
bent or preferred contractor. There is widespread evidence of this type of
comer-cutting and reduced competition throughout Government. OMB has
declared it intolerable.114 The challenge for Contracting Officers is to be
aware of the market and understand the industry well enough to reasonably
determine when it makes sense to open a task order only to limited offerors
and when full competition is necessary.
OFPP drafted a "Best Practices for Multiple Award Task and Delivery
Order Contracting" Guide with the stated purpose of "help[ing] agencies re-
engineer their traditional procedures for awarding orders under the old, single
award IDIQ contracts and take full advantage of the flexibilities available
today when using multiple award contracts." ' Examples of best practices
GAO/NSIAD-00-225, ARMY SHOULD Do MORE TO CONTROL CONTRACT COST IN THE
BALKANS (2000).
152. See S. REP. No. 103-258 (1994), supra note 63, at 2561, 2576. The COFC has
found that by failing to consider the benefits of making multiple awards under a contract
for local telecommunications services for federal agencies nationwide, a Contracting Of-
ficer acted in violation of FAR 16.504(c). The agency's decision to award a single IDIQ
contract was held to be "arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law." The court, however,
did not find the geographic scope of the proposed contract to be antithetical to the
requirement for full and open competition. Winstar Communications, Inc. v. United
States, 41 Ct. Cl. 748 (1998).
153. 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 253j(b); implemented in regulation at
FAR 16.505(b)(1). Both the statute and regulation include an exception to the "fair
opportunity" requirement if the Contracting Officer makes a determination that (a) the
agency's needs are urgent, (b) only one source is capable, (c) the order is a logical follow-
on to an order already issued under the contract, and (d) it is necessary to place an order
to satisfy a minimum guarantee. See John Cibinic, Task and Delivery Orders: What's a "Fair
Opportunity"? 12 NASH & CIBINIc REP. 91 60 (Dec. 1998).
154. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT No. 99-116,
DoD USE OF MULTIPLE AWARD TASK ORDER CONTRACTS 10 (1999).
155. OFPP, supra note 134, at 2. In issuing the interim guide, Kelman described mul-
tiple award task order contracts as "one of the most important innovations to come out
of FASA because they allow the benefits of streamlining and ongoing competition." OFPP
Issues Interim Guidance on Task and Delivery Order Contracting, 68 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at D-11 (Aug. 11, 1997), available at http://pubs.bna.com.
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include (1) cooperation among Contracting Officers, end users, and industry
to develop a clear statement of work; (2) limiting award to a number that is
high enough to assure competition, but low enough to keep ordering man-
ageable; and (3) using an interactive solicitation development process be-
tween industry and government to ensure understanding of requirements and
increase "partnering.' '
156
Unfortunately, OFPP's Guide, without the effect of law, has been of min-
imal benefit. Its warnings against overly vague statements of work, unautho-
rized sole-source orders and reduced Contracting Officer involvement, among
others, have been largely ignored. It appears the Guide, which remains in its
1997 "interim edition" state, is not on OFPP's agenda for updating. One
might interpret the present OFPP regime's distancing from the Guide as
recognition, in retrospect, that it was a naive, oversimplified solution.
As such, Contracting Officers lack a reliable source for guidance as to
when and whether price proposals should be submitted by all awardees.157
Generally, broadly scoped contracts provide for a wide range of services that
must be tailored to the requirements of each order and appropriately priced.
In identifying the best-value contractor, it is important to compare the con-
tractors' technical approaches to a task and establish a basis for negotiating
price. 18 The path of least resistance for many Contracting Officers, however,
is simply to avoid the burden of evaluating price proposals and documenting
a best-value determination. Other times the easiest route is to rely solely on
price lists. This lack of consistency is the inevitable result of insufficient
substantive guidance and a contracting workforce without market savvy.
F. The Proliferation of Interagency Contracting and Questionable Service Fees
The MAS is an additional contracting option that allows Contracting
Officers to avoid competition. When GSA first established MAS, its goal
was to make it user-friendly for customers and provide a large assortment of
reputable goods and services at competitive prices. The Federal Supply
Schedules (FSS), a collection of GSA-issued MAS, are catalogs of firms of-
fering goods and services to agencies at identified times and prices. 159 Selec-
tion for inclusion on the list implies the firm has competed for award; there-
fore, orders placed against the MAS are considered to have endured full and
open competition. 160
Agencies order off schedules for simplicity and efficiency. The schedules
themselves are widely popular because they are implemented in the form of
156. See OFPP, supra note 134, at 4-5.
157. See Cibinic, supra note 153.
158. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/NSIAD 98-215, ACQUIsI-
TION REFORM: MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACTING AT SIx FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS 2
(1998).
159. See John Cibinic, MAS: What Are They? 11 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 60 (Nov.
1997).
160. See 10 U.S.C. § 2302(2)(C) (1994) and 41 U.S.C. § 259(b)(3) (2001).
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broadly defined task and delivery order contracts.' 61 IDIQ contracts are often
the method of choice for the FSS and GWACs because they allow numerous
agencies to order diverse requirements quickly without having to conduct
separate procurements. Reliance on the Economy Act also permits one
agency to procure under another's contract without full and open com-
petition, provided the original contract was awarded in compliance with
CICA. 162
This practice of ordering and servicing relationships among agencies is
arguably a win-win proposition. The ordering agency achieves administrative
savings by avoiding the time and cost of awarding and managing a new
contract, while the servicing agency receives a fee for its share of the min-
isterial costs.
Lacking careful management, however, agencies have abused this powerful
tool, leading Congress to address at least part of the problem. 63 The FAR
Council answered by mandating documentation of an agency's determination
that placing the order is in the best interest of the Government. The agency
also must show the goods and services cannot be as efficiently and affordably
purchased directly from a contractor.' 64The proliferation of GWACs also has
caused some to question whether an accountability system exists to confirm
that servicing agencies hold the required issuing authority. 65
The use of task and delivery order contracts to execute interagency orders
has been associated with the same kinds of abuses as indefinite delivery
contracting. The common denominator is the receding role of the Con-
161. "Contract off-loading is the use by one procurement office, under the authority
of the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535, 1536, of the contracts of another office to fulfill
its requirements." Ralph C. Nash, Contract Off-Loading: A Proper Downsizing and Stream-
lining Tool? 10 NASH & CIBINIc RFP. " 24 (1996).
162. Economy Act transactions, however, are not exempt from SBA regulations. In its
decision letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, discussed above, GAO specifically stated
that the Air Force's use of the Economy Act as a contracting medium did not exempt it
from adhering to the Small Business Act. See Valenzuela Eng'g, Inc., B-277979, Jan. 26,
1998, 98-1 CPD 51.
163. See Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 1074, 108 Stat. 3243 (1994).
164. See FAR 17.503; Nash, supra note 161.
165. The authority for GWACs derives from the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 40
U.S.C. § 1412(3). For an order to be valid, the servicing agency must have delegated
authority to use the Act's provisions from the Director of the OMB. See Cibinic, supra
note 2. The four original GWACs were issued by the Department of Transportation (In-
formation Technology Omnibus Procurement), Defense Information Services Agency
(Defense Enterprise Integration Services II), National Institutes of Health (Chief Infor-
mation Officer-Solution and Partners), and GSA (Federal Systems Integration and Man-
agement). Recognizing that the system needed some policing, the program managers for
each of the four GWACS signed a set of guiding principles for managing their programs.
The joint pact promises to support sound competition and improve governmentwide con-
tracting processes. See Program Managers Set Up "Rules of Road" for GWACS, 39 Gov'T
CONTRACTOR 91 446, at 4 (Sept. 17, 1997). More agencies have since awarded GWACS,
and a complete list can be found at http://genesis.gsfc.nasa.gov/nasa/adpmass.htm. See
Cibinic, supra note 2.
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tracting Officer and his or her ability to enforce rules intended to preserve
competition.
VI. Recommendations for Improvement
For several years, we have learned to live with streamlined efficiency,
innovative contracting methods, and doing more with less-all progeny of
the procurement reform movement. In practice, flaws have surfaced. Since
passage of FASA, the FAR Council has issued three rounds of regulatory
guidance concerning indefinite delivery contracting and a fourth has been
issued for comment, but the government contract community has found its
guidance to be for the most part ineffective. If nothing constructive is done,
the precarious combination of broadly termed indefinite delivery contracts
steered by overworked, undertrained acquisition personnel will have a crip-
pling impact on the Government's ability to procure and the public's faith
in its performance. This section contains a discussion of efforts taken to
improve the present circumstances-some effectively, others less so. It fur-
ther includes the following recommendations: (1) to share best practices
among agencies and institute substantive internal guidance in the face of the
FAR Council's failure to implement meaningful governmentwide regulations,
(2) to generate congressional attention to systemic abuses similar to methods
used by small businesses fighting bundling, and (3) to draft a genuine, long-
term plan for improving professionalism among Contracting Officers.
A. Why FAR Revisions to Date Have Failed to Provide a Solution
The FAR changes since 1995 concerning indefinite delivery contracts can
be described generally as simple and uninspiring. The first set of rules imple-
mented pursuant to FASA defined task order and delivery order contracts,
prohibited protests in connection with task and delivery order awards, created
an ombudsman position, established the preference for multiple awards, and
established instances in which single awards are more appropriate, all dis-
cussed above. The background section to FAR Case 94-711 explained that
the regulation "contains no specific procedures for making awards of indefi-
nite quantity contracts in order to empower agencies to develop selection
criteria that meet needs of each acquisition. ' 166 Subsequently, when problems
began to arise out of vague work statements and a general indolence regarding
the issuance of task orders, critics clamored for more practical guidance.
The FAR Council's subsequent revisions were consistent with the OFPP's
goal of enabling Contracting Officers to use their discretion to fuel innova-
tion. In 1999, FAR Case 98-007 prohibited agencies from establishing "pre-
ferred offerors," or employing designation and allocation among multiple
awardees, as a means of simplifying and standardizing the issuance of orders. 167
166. FAR CASE 94-711, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,723, 49,724 (Sept. 26, 1995).
167. Federal Acquisition Circular 97-12 (Aug. 16, 1999).
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Agencies were to give each multiple awardee a fair opportunity to compete
for task or delivery orders, thereby upholding the principle of continuous
competition. A DoD IG audit uncovered Contracting Officers' frequent prac-
tice of sole-sourcing task orders without consideration of price and without
documenting their use of discretion.
168
In reaction to similar reports of Contracting Officers trading efficiency for
competition, the Senate inserted language in the DoD Authorization Act for
FY2000 requiring the FAR Council to issue yet another set of revised regu-
lations.1 69 Section 804 of the Act ordered specific guidance on the appropri-
ate use of governmentwide contracts. It also called for guidelines to guarantee
clear work statements and a "fair opportunity" process when awarding and
administering multiple award task and delivery order contracts.
There was a sense of hope within government contracting circles that
these regulations might provide the substantive guidance Contracting Offi-
cers desperately needed. Again there was disappointment when the changes
amounted to purely generalized suggestions. FAR Case 99-014 merely em-
phasized criteria for the Contracting Officer's consideration in determining
whether to make multiple awards and required documentation of that deci-
sion. It also underscored the use of performance-based statements of work
and required consideration of cost or price among the factors in the selection
decision for orders, but it was too little too late.
In response to congressional concern regarding oversight and additional
guidance for multiple award-type contracts, GAO focused its most recent
review of task order contracting on DoD's use of large orders under multiple-
award IT contracts. 70 This report is being considered and evaluated by the
FAR Council as it prepares FAR Change 99-303, which is discussed below.'
GAO recommended the FAR Council develop regulations to provide
168. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT No. 99-116,
DoD USE OF MULTIPLE AWARD TASK ORDER CONTRACTS 15-19 (1999).
169. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).
170. See Martha A. Matthews, Senate Panel to Look at Need for Guidance, Oversight for
Multiple Award-Type Contracts, 72 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 513 (Nov. 11, 1999);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-00-56, CONTRACT MANAGE-
MENT: FEW COMPETING PROPOSALS FOR LARGE DoD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORDERS
1 (2000).
171. GAO investigated whether contractors were afforded a fair opportunity to com-
pete for orders, and whether ordering offices were clearly identifying the scope of work
under task or delivery orders. GAO's review of twenty-two large orders indicated that
many of the orders were awarded without competition, exceptions to the "fair opportunity"
requirement were often implemented, and contractors often failed to submit offers when
presented with the opportunity. In sixteen of twenty-two orders, only one offer was sub-
mitted. Furthermore, in interviews with contractor representatives, GAO learned that
most task order descriptions are broadly and vaguely drafted, contemplate cost reimburse-
ment, and often span several years of effort. In response, agency officials noted that a great
deal of uncertainty exists in specifying future IT needs because of constantly evolving
requirements. See GAO REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-00-56, supra note 170, at 1.
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guidance that agencies must (a) avoid awarding follow-on orders whose scope
exceeds the original order for which there was competition, (b) encourage
the use of fixed-price contracts as part of a preference for performance-based
statements, (c) take part in more outreach meetings with contractors being
considered for award of offers, and, finally, (d) obtain the full benefit asso-
ciated with the expanded competition of multiple-award contracts.
FAR Proposed Rule 99-303 also is intended to implement that portion
of section 804 mandating guidance on governmentwide and multiagency
contracts. The proposed revision was recently published in the Federal Reg-
ister, inviting comments." 2 The FAR Council intends the amendment to
clarify acquisition planning considerations that should be implemented in
the earliest stages of planning for multiple-award indefinite delivery con-
tracts. Specifically, the revised language draws attention to using ordering
vehicles that facilitate access by small business concerns and early coordi-
nation with the competition advocate for plans proposing other than full and
open competition. The proposed revision also emphasizes that development
of an acquisition plan is not waived for GWACs and reasserts that the head
of the agency must designate a task- and delivery-order ombudsman.'73 The
new revisions do little more than reemphasize earlier recommendations and
are hardly worth the wait.
GAO continues to audit indefinite delivery contracts precisely because
Contracting Officers have learned to stay within the letter of the rules with-
out embodying their spirit. Trouble often follows when uniquely complex
circumstances are wedged into existing boilerplates. It always will be more
tempting for Contracting Officers to employ unfocused, stock work descrip-
tions than to tailor such descriptions to particular situations. It is only human
nature to choose the path of least resistance.
Agency leaders must make significant revisions at the supplemental regu-
lation level to implement guidance addressing very specific problem areas.
The process might start with generic best-practices principles borrowed from
other agencies, but it will be more effective if it evolves into guidelines il-
lustrated by concrete examples. Contracting personnel will find such exam-
ples to be a useful and substantial foundation upon which to build.
The Valenzuela case had a sobering effect at the Corps, which responded
to GAO's letters with several rounds of regulatory fine-tuning. More impor-
tantly, the reforms have become a team effort with representation and sug-
gestions from field elements, centers of expertise, and small business, con-
tracting, and legal offices. The revisionists returned to the beginning and
addressed the need for clarification at Engineer FAR Supplement Part 7,
172. See FAR CASE 1999-303, Federal Acquisition Regulation: Task-Order and
Delivery-Order Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,518 (Aug. 23, 2001).
173. See id.
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Acquisition Planning. The Army acquisition leadership has reinforced the
importance of such combined efforts in a memorandum to senior leaders
encouraging "the integration of the efforts of all personnel responsible for
significant aspects of the acquisition" at the acquisition planning phase. 74
The message refers to the Contracting Officer as a key business advisor whose
expertise in the many available contracting vehicles is of great value to the
acquisition team.
The Corps has adopted a unique concept to improve the acquisition team's
ability to manage and self-police its procurement strategies, by requiring con-
tracting personnel to draft a yearly master plan, including maximizing the
use of indefinite delivery contracts while avoiding hollow contracts. The
procedures for developing this annual plan involve basing minimum dollar
amounts on known work requirements and identifying at least one known
requirement before an indefinite delivery contract is advertised. The guid-
ance also calls for review of certain acquisition plans by the deputy for small
business to ensure a mix of large and small indefinite delivery contracts. The
underlying interest in all these added guidelines is to promote competition
and small business opportunities.
A more complex challenge for the Corps is to award broad, robust con-
tracts with the proper balance of marketing the agency's contracting abilities
without discouraging small business participation or resulting in underutili-
zation. This means drafting solicitations that specify the customer, work type,
and geographic boundaries, as well as providing written justification and es-
tablishing head of contracting activity (HCA) oversight of nationwide in-
definite delivery contracts.
NASA has been at the forefront of agency efforts to issue internal guidance
on IDIQ contracts. Its guidance instructs the Contracting Officer to structure
solicitations to include sample tasks and ensure a valid basis for evaluation
of cost and technical factors. Its regulations also require selection of contract
types commensurate to cost risk and drafting orders in performance-based
terms within the contract scope. Performance-based terms are favored be-
cause they hold contractors accountable for the price of the orders and quality
of technical performance.17
During her confirmation hearings before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, the new OFPP Administrator, Angela Styles, remarked that the
founding principles of federal procurement-competition, integrity, and
transparency-must not be compromised for efficiency. 76 Speaking broadly,
Styles criticized the confusion surrounding implementation of streamlining
174. See Acquisition Planning Memorandum from Kenneth J. Oscar, Assistant Sec-
retary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, to all Army commanders
and program executive officers (Aug. 3, 2001) (on file with author).
175. See NASA Issues Guidance on IDIIQ Contracts for Technical Services, Supplies, 69
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 571 (May 18, 1998).
176. See OFPP Nominee Says Efficiency Shouldn't Be at Expense of Procurement Concepts,
75 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 520 (May 22, 2001).
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initiatives and recognized her office's challenge would be to "balance the
obvious benefits of increased efficiencies" while addressing "serious compet-
itive problems that have arisen."' 77 It appears that, while indefinite delivery
contracting is a perfect example of a reform initiative in need of attention,
Styles's main focus, at least initially, will be to fix the broken OMB A-76
Circular system and emphasize the use of performance-based service con-
tracts.'78 As cycles go, indefinite delivery contracting has had its turn on
OFPP's and FAR Council's front burner and newer issues have come to the
fore. Agency leadership will have to assume responsibility and provide in-
ternal guidance with best practices that build upon existing regulations.
B. Lessons Learned from Efforts to Tighten the Regulation of Contract Bundling
To the extent statutory changes are needed to curb abuses of the indefinite
delivery contracting tool, advocates for reform can look to recent restrictions
imposed on contract bundling for a paradigm. The Comptroller General re-
cently described allegations of improper bundling and unduly restricted com-
petition as leading to the
intersection of three significant procurement initiatives-the desire to maximize full and
open competition by prohibiting the unnecessary consolidation of discrete requirements
in a manner that restricts competition; the desire to maximize federal government reliance
on small business prime contractors by barring consolidation of procurements into pack-
ages that are not suitable for performance by small businesses; and the desire to streamline
government purchases by, among other approaches, using preplaced (and often broadly-
scoped) contractual instruments.., to add speed and flexibility to an agency's buying
power.'179
These same three elements should be part of every reasoned approach to
returning accountability and competition to indefinite delivery contracting.
Bundling is one of indefinite delivery contracting's unpleasant side effects,
but meaningful advances have been made in controlling its abuse. Lessons
can be learned and shared from measures taken to bring bundling under
control.
Just as with task and delivery order contracts, bundling has received a
great deal of scrutiny from the DOD IG [defined above] and GAO, as well as
the SBA Office of Advocacy. In part because the reports rely heavily on
statistical data, the resultant recommendations vary. An SBA Office of Ad-
vocacy report charges that the increasingly popular practice of bundling is
"accelerating the concentration of larger and fewer federal contracts into the
hands of larger and fewer companies."' 8 It cites a decline since the beginning
177. Id. at 521.
178. Id.
179. Phoenix Scientific Corp., B-286817, Feb. 22, 2001, 2001 CPD " 24 (emphasis
added).
180. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE IMPACT OF
CONTRACT BUNDLING ON SMALL BUSINESS FY 1992-FY 1999, at v (2000).
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of the procurement reform era of contract dollars awarded to small businesses.
Seventy-nine billion dollars were awarded in bundled contracts in FY 1999,
and only 16 percent of the small businesses that won bundled contracts that
year accounted for 84 percent of all small business revenues."s, At that level,
bundled contracts cost small businesses $26 billion annually and are hurting
small business owners. 2 In addition to violating policy goals, this practice
will have a detrimental impact on the Government's ability to acquire its
needs at competitive prices and ensure a stable procurement industry base.8 3
The Office of Advocacy also has convinced the House Small Business
Committee that bundling is in large part to blame for DoD's failure to meet
its 23 percent goal for small business awards.184 Small businesses have two
vocal advocates on the committee, Chairman Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.) and
ranking member Rep. Nydia Velazquez (D-N.Y.), who question DoD's com-
mitment to small business. As a result, Velazquez introduced a bill that would
prohibit agencies from consolidating requirements until they have achieved
their small business goals.185 Manzullo held hearings urging DoD to give small
businesses more opportunities to compete. Velazquez implored the Comp-
troller General to sustain a protest filed by a small business challenging
the Air Force's solicitation for a multibillion-dollar multiple-award IDIQ
contract consolidating technical weapons system support services for three
logistics centers, calling it a "David v. Goliath story."'18 6 In Washington, it
often takes congressional pressure for an issue to effect change. Advocates
of change in the indefinite delivery contracting arena should organize their
interests and target the Government Reform Subcommittees in both
houses to publicize the many flawed and unfair aspects of indefinite delivery
contracting.18 7
Despite the high-profile attention brought to bear on bundling, there
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at vi.
184. See DoD Acquisition Reforms Are Hurting Small Business, House Panel Told, 75 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 664 (June 26, 2001).
185. See The Small Business Contract Equity Act of 2001, H.R. 1324 (Mar. 29, 2001);
DoD Acquisition Reforms, supra note 184.
186. Two Congressmen Appeal to GAO on FAST Solicitation on Behalf of Small Georgia
Firm, 75 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 180 (Feb. 13, 2001). Notably, the firm was
not a constituent to either member.
187. Congressional lobbying will not be devoid of controversy. While the SBA Office
of Advocacy claims bundling and federal acquisition reforms of the mid-1990s have hin-
dered small businesses because of the tendency to issue solicitations with overly broad
work descriptions, two recent GAO reports show bundling has little or no impact on small
businesses. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/GGD-00-82, SMALL
BUSINESSES: LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON CONTRACT BUNDLING'S EXTENT AND
EFFECTS (2000); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-01-746, CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT: SMALL BUSINESSES CONTINUE TO WIN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
(2001).
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appear to be little actual data on its extent and effect on small businesses.'88
GAO did recommend that the SBA Administrator establish a dependable
bundling oversight strategy, but there is no guarantee this will be imple-
mented soon.'8 9 The other important element in restricting improper bun-
dling has been passage of the Small Business Reauthorization Act (SBRA)
of 1997190 and a significant number of GAO protests that have placed bound-
aries on the propriety of bundling. The SBRA stated a federal policy of avoid-
ing "unnecessary and unjustified bundling" and provided specific guidance
for documenting "measurably substantial benefits" derived from consolida-
tion and garnering SBA participation in bundling decisions.' 9'
The SBA implementing regulations and FAR provide detailed procedures
to justify bundling, including quantifying the benefit of consolidating re-
quirements. 92 Another notable element of the SBRA is that it allows SBA
to file protests against proposed bundling at the agency level and protest
level. 19 To further this accountability measure, SBA regulations invite in-
dividuals to report agency bundling actions. 94
The Comptroller General has issued a series of decisions interpreting the
"measurably substantial benefits" standard provided in the SBRA. In the most
significant decisions, GAO upheld bundling as an acceptable response to
downsizing and funding shortages. In Phoenix Scientific, the Comptroller Gen-
eral accepted the agency's rationale that it had consolidated requirements in
an effort to cope with "significant reductions in its civilian work force, the
unique requirements of maintaining an aging aircraft fleet and decreases in
Air Force Funding."'' 9 The Comptroller General is taking a hard look and
188. GAO's analysis of information in the Federal Procurement Data System indicates
that federal agencies did meet the governmentwide goal of 23 percent for prime contract
awards to small businesses. The report explains the SBA Office of Advocacy used a larger
universe of numbers to achieve its statistics. See GAO REP. No. GAO/GGD-00-82, supra
note 187, at 2. When GAO conducted specific case studies, however, they resulted in
findings that even where agencies consolidate work to the extent that small business
participation might be limited, the agency often coordinates with the SBA to determine
where small businesses could be accommodated. See GAO REP. No. GAO-01-746, supra
note 187, at 22.
189. See GAO REp. No. GAO/GGD-00-82, supra note 187.
190. Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-135, 111 Stat.
2592 (1997).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 644 (e).
192. See FAR 7.107 (b).
193. See John Cibinic, Contract Bundling: Another Update, 15 NASH & CIBINIC REP.
9T51 (Apr. 2001).
194. See id.
195. Phoenix Scientific Corp., B-286817, Feb. 22, 2001, 2001 CPD 24. Other ac-
ceptable justifications for bundling include consolidation of utility services where the
agency reasonably believes it will not receive competition for all requirements if solicited
separately (Virginia Electric & Power Co., B-285209, Aug. 2, 2000, 2000 CPD 9[ 134); a
decision is made to award several projects to only one contractor because of limited storage
area (Malone Constr. Co., B-280021, Aug 18, 1998, 1998 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 283);
the agency no longer had sufficient staff to award separate contracts (Advanced Elevator
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considering as a mitigating factor agencies' efforts to ensure small business
participation, such as reserving certain awards under a multiple award con-
tract for small business.
The Senate Small Business Committee chairman has urged the Bush ad-
ministration to develop stringent criteria for federal agencies to monitor the
extent to which prime contractors offer subcontracting opportunities to small
businesses. If Congress can identify and quantify the impact of bundling, the
next step is to begin to devise alternative statutory strategies. 96 The same
principles are relevant to refining the use of IDIQ contracting.
The good news is that individuals within the government contracting
community are debating the issues of indefinite delivery contracting. Even if
minds differ, for example, as to whether bundling has impacted small business,
there is a sense of vigilance and voice. The private attorneys general are at
work. There is hope for change when ideas can be distilled from a group of
diverse-minded individuals. Challenges expand the mind and allow one to
overcome bad habits on an individual level. They lead to a point where
Contracting Officers make choices not out of belief or habit but by extending
themselves and implementing shared ideas founded in public-service values.
As a leader of this change, a Contracting Officer will never again doubt the
value of his or her position on the acquisition team.
C. The Contracting Officer's Relevance and the Profession's Future
In addition to the need for a new agency-level regulatory fix and con-
gressional attention, the acquisition workforce crisis must be addressed. In
the aggregate, Congress and the agencies must right the imbalances in skills
and experience caused by downsizing and stem the impending retirement
exodus of baby-boomer contracting personnel. At the local level, balance
must be achieved between discretion and accountability. The Contracting
Officer and end user both must be educated to recognize the long-range costs
of avoiding competition. The "acquisition team" referenced in FAR part 1
needs a strong "owner" figure in the HCA and a capable "manager" figure in
the Contracting Officer.
Contracting Officers often sense they must prove themselves individually
to overcome a secondary status and low expectations. These slights reflect
the history of the Contracting Officer employment series, which at one time
Servs., Inc., B-272340, B-272340.2, Sept. 26, 1996, 96-2 CPD 9 125); and the agency
decides to bundle a systems integration contract because breaking the technical require-
ments into separate contracts puts the coordination responsibility on the Government,
making it subject to claims (Phoenix Tech. Servs. Corp., B-274694.2, Mar. 12, 1997,
1997 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 409; Magnavox Electronic Systems, B-258037, Dec. 8,
1994, 94-2 CPD T 227; Titan Dynamics Simulations, B-257559, Oct. 13, 1994, 94-2
CPD T 139; Resource Consultants, Inc., B-255053, Feb. 1, 1994, 94-1 CPD 59.).
196. See Leroy H. Armes, DoD Contract Consolidation Reduces Small Business Partici-
pation as Primes, Study Finds, 75 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 446, 447 (May 1,
2001) (quoting Sen. Chris Bond (R-Mo.)).
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was seen as a means of advancing one's federal government career out of the
secretarial pool. 97 While Contracting Officers have campaigned for profes-
sional status and been empowered by shrinking regulations, senior agency
procurement officials have failed to motivate and train them to be the team
leaders they need to be.
Traditional professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers, must un-
dergo several years of apprenticeship or internship before earning the full
status of their occupation. The mentoring, questioning, and learning by ex-
ample that comes from this process simply cannot be synopsized into a forty-
or even eighty-hour contracting course. The toolbox of skills needed by Con-
tracting Officers today include interpersonal communication, active
listening, planning and organizing, decision making, persuasion, and lead-
ership. These skills, all of which support the fundamental "business judgment"
Contracting Officers must employ, can only come through experience and
coaching.
The sense of secondary status among contracting personnel must be abol-
ished. Dynamic leadership is needed to bring together the acquisition team
and infuse it with a spirit of inclusiveness. When individuals work together
toward a common goal, each adding value to the project, a sense of respect
and confidence grows from within. The colleagues who come together as part
of the acquisition team must include the program manager, Contracting Of-
ficer, technical experts, and legal and small business offices. Team learning
among a group of individuals with diverse expertise creates a bond so that
every member begins to feel important and valued.
This interdependent approach to learning provides an important aspect
of professional training: the exposure to critical ideas. When a member of
the small business office educates the program manager that setting aside
work for small or small, disadvantaged businesses builds capable suppliers, a
good industrial base, and benefits competition, that program manager is more
likely to turn to his colleagues than to the contractor for trusted advice and
direction. That program manager will be better capable, moreover, of ex-
plaining the acquisition process's guiding principles to the end user. Coor-
dination through awareness-raising and active listening, as well as even more
fundamental factors such as trust, can bring true empowerment to the ac-
quisition team. Once a sense of trust and common goals is fostered, the di-
verse membership of the acquisition team can become something of a "col-
lective ombudsman" to ensure effective competition as envisioned by FASA.
When an acquisition team establishes itself as a cohesive unit, it becomes
the HCA's responsibility to give recognition and visibility to the group. The
modem manager is expected to set the tone and has a major duty as team
builder. This sense of clout and status, earned collectively rather than indi-
197. DAWIA specifically required the establishment of specified career paths for ac-
quisition personnel that would allow individuals to rise to the highest level of the defense
acquisition system. See 10 U.S.C. § 1734 (2001).
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vidually, will allow the Contracting Officer to assert himself as a proud mem-
ber of a professional organization.
The concept of acquisition team as internship, however, cannot take the
place of improved, funded education for Contracting Officers. That educa-
tion must build a business knowledge of the various markets from which the
Contracting Officer buys on a regular basis. Regrettably, it appears policy-
makers are more willing to waive education requirements than fund and
manage them. Section 808 of the 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires
contract specialists in the GS- 1102 series to have a bachelor's degree and at
least twenty-four semesters of business-related coursework regardless of work
experience.198 Rather than invest in the future and send thousands of contract
specialists back to school, the acting undersecretary of defense directed
agency officials to apply the educational requirements only to new contract-
ing personnel starting in their jobs after October 1, 2000. The guidance
memorandum even suggests officials invoke the waiver provision in the
original version of DAWIA to exempt new personnel entering the GS-1102
series between October 1, 2000, and March 21, 2001, from the stricter edu-
cation standard.199 This attitude is simply reckless. Experience has proven
that the future of procurement reform depends on the quality of the acqui-
sition workforce.
VII. Conclusion
Over the years since FASA "legitimized" indefinite delivery contracting,
GAO audits, DoD IG reports, and Comptroller General decisions have iden-
tified numerous instances of Contracting Officers circumventing competition
rules behind the scenes of task and delivery order contracts. The legitimacy
of certain indefinite delivery contracting practices remains very much in
question. Small businesses often are edged out of competitions and left with-
out a bid protest remedy. Public confidence in government procurement prac-
tices suffers when transparency is limited and contractors lose faith in the
system. Careful refinements that were never implemented (as the Section
800 Panel and Congress intended) are now essential to stem apparent abuses
of Contracting Officer discretion. Agency leaders must define boundaries and
reemphasize the significance of competition through the use of substantive
agency guidance,
Most of the misuse associated with indefinite delivery contracting arises
out of a widespread belief that the gaps in regulatory guidance equate to
consent for circumventing full competition. Contracting Officers, entrusted
with increased discretion, also are encumbered by disproportionately heavy
198. See Kellie Lunney, Pentagon Says Contract Specialists Don't Have to Go Back to
School, Gov. EXEC. COM DAILY BRIEFING (April 4, 2001), available at http://www.
govexec.com/dailyfed/0401/040401ml.htm.
199. See 10 U.S.C. § 1737(c) (2001).
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workloads, which resulted from poorly managed workforce reductions. In-
creased pressure, in many cases, led to competition being traded for efficiency.
All of this is far removed from the "streamlining" reformists intended to
establish with empowerment and innovative contracting tools. To return
procurement reform to its intended course, agencies must recognize the tre-
mendous significance of human resources as well as the human tendency to
seek and follow guidance.
